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Design- to-Cost has been instituted as one of several
reforms to Department of Defense procurement practices.
This thesis presents historical needs for such reforms.
Design- to-Cost is described and placed in context with
other policy revisions. Impacts of recent changes and
resultant controversies are explored. Sample cases display
the actual implementation of Design- to-Cost . Problem areas
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The Department of Defense (DOD) has undergone sweeping
changes during recent years with respect to its procurement
practices. Many new policies have been instituted, either
as temporary fixes, or as possible long range solutions to
diverse procurement problems. As with most sudden organi-
zational changes, the reactions to these changes have been
mixed. This thesis addresses the implementation of Design-
to-Cost (DTC) from the points of view of policy and appli-
cations .
A. PURPOSE OF THE PAPER
Since the middle 1960 's DOD has experienced gigantic in-
creases in weapon system costs. This has been accompanied
by increasing criticism, charges of mismanagement, and, in
some cases, accusations of outright dishonesty and fraud on
the parts of both government employees and contractors. Re-
actions by the press, public, and Congress have resulted in
closer scrutiny than ever before of DOD policies and actions.
The defense budget, once by far the largest component of
federal spending, has become a favorite target for cost
cutters of various motivations. As a result, DOD funding has
remained relatively fixed in purchasing power while overall
governmental spending sets new records each year. As a result,
the growing costs of developing systems are rapidly outstrip-





of these budgetary constraints in the foreseeable future are
dim (Ref . 1)
.
The manner in which DTC was imposed by the Secretary of
Defense (SECDEF) in the early 1970's gave little direct guid-
ance concerning its application. Having been provided with
only a general statement of policy, lower level managers were
left in a position of having to solve many of the practical
problems of its implementation. Such an approach, while
being very broad and flexible, has also led to a large amount
of uncertainty and confusion. The volumes of material written
since have only partially alleviated the problem.
Life cycle cost (LCC)
,
the overall cost of development,
acquisition, ownership, and disposal of a system, has been
imposed as a primary design parameter. In practice, however,
this has been true only in rare instances, not because of
disinterest, but rather because few people, if any, know how
to do it. Weapon system life cycle costs have little in the
way of historical material from which to draw. The data that
does exist is largely unavailable or grossly distorted by
inconsistent cost definitions and accounting practices. In
an effort to overcome these difficulties, parametric cost
estimating relationships (CER) have been developed. This
is a new concept, which uses available empirical historical
cost data to predict new weapon system costs. Being new,
the applicability and reliability of CER's is not yet fully
demonstrated
Rather than designing to minimize life cycle costs, mini-
mam unit production costs (UPC) have become the primary
16

cost considerations. This is more or less by default, due to
state of the art limitations for defining LCC. Even this UPC
is subject to differing definitions. Studies have shown a
lack of a standardized approach to any of these problems.
Finally, there is a serious question as to how or even
if Design- to-Cost should be applied to procurement projects
already in development.
The intent of this study is to offer some recommendations
toward the solution of the many problems confronting the imple-
mentation of Design- to-Cost , and to suggest areas in which
further study is required. In order to accomplish this, a
comprehensive literature review was performed. This was
followed by field trips to the Naval Weapons Center (NWC)
China Lake, California where the concept is being applied to
various naval weapon system procurements. The authors inter-
viewed the management personnel responsible for contract
development and administration at a variety of project of-
fices to obtain first hand information concerning the current
problems being faced by middle management. In addition to
this, telephone interviews were conducted with personnel
associated with other Navy, Army, and Air Force projects.
The programs selected for review are all aerospace pro-
jects; however, they range in size from a small subsystem
component procurement to a major weapon system acquisition.
The stage of development of the selected programs also varies,
from the early stages of conceptual planning in one case, to
another for which a contract was awarded for initial production
17

B. DEFINITIONS OF DESIGN-TO-COST
The confusion and controversy concerning DTC begins with
basic aims and definitions. As will be shown, the major
policy setting levels within DOD have not agreed upon some
important points.
The Secretary of Defense in imposing DTC upon the services
in DOD Directive 5000.1 (Ref. 2) stated:
"Cost parameters shall be established which consider
the cost of acquisition and ownership; discrete cost ele-
ments (e.g., unit production cost, operating and support
cost) shall be translated into 'design to' requirements.
System development shall be continuously evaluated against
these requirements with the same rigor as that applied to
technical requirements. Practical tradeoffs shall be made
between system capability, cost, and schedule."
Thus, one sees that basic DTC philosophy is built around
LCC, including production and later operating and support
costs
.
This tends to contrast with the Joint Service Agreement
(Ref. 3) on how DTC is to be approached:
"Design- to-Cost is a process utilizing unit cost goals
as thresholds for managers and as design parameters for
engineers. A single average 'Unit Flyaway Cost' goal is
approved by DSARC for the program. This goal is then
broken down into unit production cost (UPC) goals by the
Program Manager and provided to each contractor or in-
house source for the appropriate major subsystem. The
dollar value for each goal represents what the government
has established as an amount it can afford (i.e., is
willing and able) to pay for a unit of military equipment
or major subsystem which meets established and measurable
performance requirements at a specified production quantity
and rate during a specified period of time.
"Unit production cost, schedule, and performance goals
must not be achieved at the expense of life cycle cost."
Now one sees why DTC has addressed primarily UPC and made LCC
merely a secondary consideration. In this context, LCC is
18

defined to include research, development, test § evaluation
(RDT§E) as well as UPC and operations and support (0$S) costs,
Other highly placed sources within DOD have written:
".
. .design to a price means that DOD will establish a
unit production price that the defense budget allows and
reflects the military value of the equipment. Attainment
of that price will be made a criterion of procurement."
(Ref. 4)
.
In this case DTC addresses only UPC.
This seeming lack of coordination and understanding at
the highest levels of DOD management has done little to aid
the practitioners in the field. One now finds individual
projects defining cost goals and their attainment in any
manner convenient.
Obviously, from a cost control standpoint, there must be
some sort of balance between UPC and overall LCC. Wbat this
is and how it is achieved has never been authoritatively
stated
.
C. REQUIREMENT FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF DESIGN-TO-COST
Department of Defense Directive 5000.1, (Ref. 2) formally
prescribes a new approach to weapons procurement. General
policies were revised for all major systems. In addition,
specific actions and guidelines were delineated for a new
acquisition cycle. These guidelines included the requirement
to implement DTC.
This implementation of DTC has been the subject of con-
siderable uncertainty and controversy and is examined in




II. HISTORY OF EVENTS LEADING TO THE
REQUIREMENT FOR DESIGN-TO-COST
The historical background of events leading to the
institution of DTC and other procurement changes are dis-
cussed in this section.
A. McNAMARA PHILOSOPHY
During the middle 1960 's the Department of Defense
operated with Secretary McNamara's Planning, Programming,
Budgeting (PPB) system. Under this structure the services
were directed to meet their worldwide commitments in a "cost
effective" manner. Little, if any, fiscal guidance was given
to the military planners. Program directors were given nn
explicit spending ceilings (Ref. 5). McNamara, himself,
stated: "... the United States is well able to spend what-
ever it needs to spend on national security" (Ref. 6). The
overall defense budget was to be sized to meet whatever
foreign policy objectives were sought.
Service planners often found it difficult, however, to
obtain force level increases from the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) or Congress. For this reason, the military
planners then demanded the highest possible performance from
such weapons as were available. Designers were encouraged
to continually advance the technical state of the art. In-
creased performance became the only real goal and was sought
at the expense of al] else (Ref. 7).
20

This era also saw the advent of the total package pro-
curement concept. The entire acquisition of a system, from
basic R£|D to final production, was to be accomplished under
one fixed price contract. The commercial world had shown
this to be a viable approach for a relatively simple product,
to be produced in a short period of time, and when complete
and accurate specifications were available. The contractor
must know exactly what is expected and how he will produce
it. Unfortunately, this type procurement procedure did not
produce the results expected of it for major weapons systems.
Difficult and conflicting demands resulted from questions of
cost, complexity, or even feasibility. Contracts were awarded
to the lowest bidders, in some cases the most desperately in
need of business. When their efforts faltered, they then
turned to the government to be bailed out of disaster. While
nice in theory, this approach just did not work out in prac-
tice (Ref . 8)
.
Policies revolved around one critical assumption, the
availability of adequate funding. Planners needed to concern
themselves only with avoiding waste or overly provocative
actions. Recent history and present Congressional mood have
subverted this assumption. Budget cuts are becoming increas-
ingly restrictive. Almost half of what money does remain in
the DOD budget goes into escalating personnel costs. Indeed,




While it is universally known that weapons costs have
escalated steadily during recent generations, controversies
have tended to center about aspects of this cost growth that
relate to policy and procedures. A recent study of these
cost areas, commissioned by Congress and conducted by the
Comptroller General (Ref. 9), outlines three major causes
of cost growth: improved weapons capability, inadequate
cost estimating ability, and requirements changes.
1 . Improved Capability
With the advancement of technology, new weapon systems
are constantly being developed, seeking wider and increased
performance capabilities. Resultant increased costs, however,
do not necessarily imply proportional performance increases.
Table I shows cost/thrust ratios for jet engines since 1956.
TABLE I
















F-100E 1956 16,000 .27 16.90
F-4E 1967 17,900 .24 13.40




Figure 1 displays the results of studies of aircraft
cost increases related to their respective performance gains




REPRESENTATIVE RELATIVE INCREASES IN COST
AND PERFORMANCE FOR THIRTEEN MAJOR SETS




















5.4 4.2 2.3 1.9 1.8 3.0 3.0 3.0
NOTE: FACTORS OF INCREASE ILLUSTRATE THE PROPORTIONAL INCREASES OF
SPECIFIED COSTS OR PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS FOR NEW WEAPON SYSTEMS OVER
THOSE BEING REPLACED. THESE FIGURES REPRESENT THE RESULTS FROM 13
WEAPON SYSTEM STUDIES FOR AIRCRAFT DEVELOPED SINCE WW II.
FIG 1
2 . Inadequate Cost Estimating Ability
The inability to estimate costs often results in cost
overruns. In order to avoid confusion surrounding the many
various definitions advanced by persons with various view-
points, the description assigned by the Comptroller General
will be applied. Cost overruns are the difference between
projected or "advertized" costs for a weapons project and
the actual costs incurred by the public. Cost overruns are
related primarily to three cause factors (Fig. 2). It is to
be noted that current estimates at the time of this study
(30 June 1972) dealt with systems still under development,
hence all related total program cost increases are not yet
included. Estimating errors due to technology, comprising
about 251 of the total overruns, are due largely to the push
for performance, technical state of the art, and overoptimism
on the parts of both contractors seeking business and services
23

seeking program approval. The second major source of
estimating error is related to inflationary cost increases,
in most cases out of the control of both contractual parties









3 . Requirements Changes
The largest cause of cost overruns is unforeseen
changes in requirements. These program changes may be due
to revisions of specifications relating to overly ambitious
performance goals and associated state of the art type tech-
nological roadblocks. Other changes have historically been
found in alterations to schedules, due cither to unanticipated
24

delays or accelerations. Procurement numbers may suddenly
face drastic cuts, thereby sharply increasing costs per copy.
These actions have been most noticeable in cases where pro-
duction has been concurrent with development. Finally, there
is the costly engineering change proposal (ECP) resulting from
changed requirements or threat scenarios, demanding upgraded
performance. Unfortunately, however, many ECP's can be traced
to poorly developed, ambiguous, or inadequate specifications.
Again, concurrent production is hardest hit by these costly
retrofits. The C-5A doubled its projected costs within less
than a five-year period, while another study of some twelve
major systems showed current estimates equal to " 3 . 2 times the
original estimates.
C. EFFECTS OF RECENT TRENDS IN WEAPONS PROCUREMENT
The increasing complexities and costs related to weapons
procurement have had numerous dangerous effects upon military
combat readiness. These are explained in the following para-
graphs :
1 . Fewer Weapon Systems Acquired
Increased program costs, coupled with decreasing bud-
gets, have led to massive reductions in the numbers of items
procured. This trend is illustrated in Table II. These fewer
weapons procured by DOD can have severe effects upon national
defense posture. A system that can be deployed in only one-
third the numbers as its predecessor must then be at least
three times as effective just to break even. Even then, the


















C5-A 120 3,423.0 81 4,526.0
DLGN-38 23 3,980.0 5 820.0
F-14 710 6,166.0 313 5,272.0
F-lll 1,388 4,686.0 466 6,994.0
LHA 9 1,380.3 5 970.0
MARK-48 (a) 720.5 (a) 1,957.9





The more complexities built into increasingly sophis-
ticated systems, the more possible areas for failures.
Down-times due to each failure increase with complexity and
sensitivity. This translates to fewer up systems available
at any time. These fewer systems ready simplify enemy targeting
or evasion problems.
3 Reduced Training
Field commanders, faced with conserving these costly
assets, will in many cases reduce training. Military readi-
ness is thereby even further degraded.
4 . Excessive Optimism
These problems have also had undesirable effects upon
industry. With procurement curtailed and fewer contracts let,
excess productive capacity increases. Competitive pressure
26

grows as companies fight ever harder for the few remaining
contracts. This, in turn, leads to undue promises of system
capabilities. To stay afloat, unrealistic cost estimates may
be submitted to "buy into" contracts.
5
.
Loss of Public Confidence
As a result, costly program failures or bailouts have
occurred, which have received wide attention in the press.
Loss of public confidence is mirrored in increased Congressional
pressures
.
6 Excessive Management Restrictions
Ever increasing numbers of rules and rigid policies
result from efforts by Congress to interject itself into day-
to-day management decisions (Ref. 10). The able people available
find themselves hamstrung by inflexible guidelines. It is felt
that the talented people are there, but better training is
needed. Experience has shown these people can function when a
critical project must be done expeditiously, but the bureaucracy
must often be bypassed in these cases (Ref. 8).
The adversary environment that has grown up between DOD
and Congress must be dispelled. Regained cooperation and under-
standing is vital to any improvements.
27

III. INTRODUCTION OF DESIGN-TO-COST
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
In mid 1971, Design- to-Cost was formally imposed by OSD
as part of a series of sweeping changes to DOD procurement
policies. In order to place DTC into its proper context with
other reforms, a review is made of implementing directives and
their impact upon Navy procurement. The directive initiating
these procurement reforms, DOD Directive 5000.1, and the Joint
Design- to-Cost Guide, representing the services' interpreta-
tion and reply to DTC are examined. Actual implementation of
DOD Directive 5000.1 within the naval establishment by SECNAV
Instruction 5000.1 is detailed. The authors describe the basic
philosophical changes required within DOD to adopt DTC and then
compare these ideas with current commercial practice. The
setting of cost and performance goals and resultant tradeoffs
are explored Finally, a brief survey is made of reactions by
DOD and contractor personnel to DTC and its implementation.
A. DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1
This directive (Ref. 2) represents a major change in DOD
procurement strategy. Providing overall policy guidance for
all major acquisitions, it has been known as both the Bible
for DOD procurement and David Packard's legacy to defense
system management (Ref. 11).
Coverage of this directive encompasses all major programs.
Such programs are herein defined as having either projected
28

RDT§E costs in excess of fifty million dollars, or production
costs of greater than two hundred million, or any other spec-
ified programs of national urgency. In addition, the manage-
ment principles are declared applicable to all programs.
These management principles are not clearly defined here.
The question arises, for example, as to whether DTC must be
applied to small programs whose size is below the thresholds
listed above. Interviews with program administrators at NWC
China Lake indicate this may not be the case. Other reputable
sources, however, claim that DTC must apply to all items in
defense inventories (Ref. 12).
One major thrust is toward decentralization of power and
decision making authority to the maximum extent practicable.
This contrasts strongly with tight MrNamara era central control
(Ref. 13). Individual program managers are to be granted broad
authority to accomplish assigned objectives. Levels of super-
visory authority are to be minimized. The presently heavy
paperwork and reporting requirements laid upon these managers
will be reduced, giving them more time for their primary duties.
The assignment, tenure, incentives, and rewards of program
managers are to be made a subject of direct concern to DOD
component heads. The primary burden of defining needs, devel-
oping systems, and source selection is shifted to the individual
services. OSD now provides only such overall policy guidance
and supervision as is necessary. Major decisions regarding
scope and direction of programs arc made by SECDEF with the
aid of the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) .
29

The DSARC cycle (Fig. 3) provides a general format for the
acquisition process. Sweeping in nature, attempts have been
made to avoid unnecessary restrictions and rigidities upon
the various kinds of programs. Specific development phases
are identified. Each phase is then followed by DSARC review
before the process is resumed. These phases and reviews are
described below.
The conceptual phase makes use of independent basic and
applied research. These studies are handled by the individual
services which will direct initial activities as they deem
appropriate. Efforts are confined largely to paper studies.
The Development Concept Paper (DCP) is the final product of
this phase, providing a brief (about twenty-page) summary of
the proposed system. Included is a general statement cf needs
or threats, performance objectives of a countering system,
alternative approaches available, the potential problems/risk
areas associated with each, and an overall procurement strat-
egy. The DCP is presented to a first DSARC review, DSARC I,
which recommends whether or not continued development is
warranted. If so, program thresholds are delineated for later
phases
.
The validation phase involves paper and hardware studies
to determine feasibility of proposed ideas. The results are
again presented for review to DSARC II where needs, LCC esti-
mates, risks, and full-scale development plans are reviewed.
Full-scale development involves final design engineering






















system together. DSARC III again reviews needs, costs, and
benefits and then provides final fiscal guidance before
production is commenced.
As mentioned earlier, LCC has been declared a primary
design parameter by DOD Directive 5000.1. Tradeoffs are
conducted among costs, performance, and schedule to assure
efficient procurement. Methods of tracking estimates and
costs must be provided, using, as much as possible, the con-
tractors' own management information systems.
In order to better define risk areas and their solution,
reliance is placed upon actual hardware testing, rather than
paper studies. This entails greater emphasis upon building
mockups and actual prototypes, greatly increasing planning
confidence
.
Contracting procedures are also changed. Total package
procurement is banned. Each phase of development now involves
separate contracts. Development contracts are of a cost
reimbursement type, while production is of a fixed price
nature. Any ECP must be costed before approval.
These policy guidelines reflect David Packard's personal
management philosophies, providing low level responsibility
and freedom with but general guidance from on top (Ref. 14).
B. JOINT DESIGN-TO-COST GUIDE
DOD Directive 5000.1 required implementation by the serv-
ices within 90 days, however, final agreement by the services
on a joint des ign - to- cos t guide took well over two years.
The result is still only a general approach to the DTC
3 2

problem (Ref. 3). Primary cost emphasis is shifted to UPC,
giving LCC only passing attention.
Specification of performance requirements for any devel-
oping system involves a series of targets and thresholds.
Targets indicate desired goals while thresholds represent
minimum allowable performance. Tradeoffs are then conducted
within these bounds in efforts to achieve target levels.
Emphasis has changed from cost justification to cost reduction,
Greatly increased flexibility is required. Once cost and
performance thresholds are established, latitude must, be
given to program managers and contractors to allow tradeoffs
of cost, performance (including maintenance and reliability),
and delivery schedule. Specifications reflect desired results
rather than detailed "how to do it" directions. Design iter-
ations involve tradeoffs to meet these thresholds. Develop-
ment funding must be related to anticipated lower production
costs
.
Cost goals currently include recurring and non-recurring
production costs. This is in recognition of state of the art
limitations for LCC. Continued pursuit of this technology
and its use is encouraged. During the conceptual phase these
cost inputs result from cost analyses supplemented by empir-
ical CER research. The average unit flyaway cost goals of
DCP become official after DSARC approval. Once set, they may
be changed only by SECDEF following another DSARC review.
During the validation phase the contractor and program man-
ager seek optimum designs through tradeoffs and other
improvements. Combinations of industrial engineering and
33

parametric cost estimates provide firmer cost data. DSARC II
is the latest time at which cost goals may be set. Obviously,
the later cost imputs are made, the smaller will be the
effects they will have upon designs.
Critical to the entire program are the realism of cost
and performance goals. Goals too easily attainable are
wasteful. On the other hand, standards set too high, espec-
ially in the area of costs, may destroy motivation or result
in ineffective systems. To assess progress a tracking process
is necessary, both for up-to-date feedback and as a historical
record. This is normally done by standard work breakdown
structure (WBS) format as contained in MIL STD 881. Formats
of required reports are also specified.
The contractual agreements provide the basic interface
between buyer and seller and, as such, have been given special
attention. Cost reimbursement contracts are to be written
for conceptual, validation, and full scale development phases.
Initial production entails fixed price incentive with later
buys requiring firm fixed prices
.
The basic criteria for these contractual relationships
require legal enforceability. The contractor must have
flexibility to make necessary tradeoffs. Means must be
provided for tracking and enforcement of thresholds. Finally,
motivation and incentives must be provided to ensure a task
is done properly. The requirements for each phase differ
considerably. Early conceptual studies do not normally have
rigid cost goals. Instead, the emphasis is upon gathering
data for later goal establishment.
34

The validation phase request for proposals (RFP) sets
goals for both cost and performance. Specifications are
limited to only those essential for output definition. Other
information to be provided includes risk specification as
currently known, configuration compatibility requirements,
schedule, employment scenario, and source selection criteria.
Contractors are required to provide supporting data to back
up estimates. The degree of flexibility afforded contractors
depends directly upon the competitive climate. At any rate,
source selection promises to be more difficult with increasing
design freedom. The contract during this time must address
the above goals, tracking procedures, and escalation factors
as well as necessary incentives. These incentives are not
normally needed in competitive situations. Otherwise, an
award fee may be deemed appropriate.
Full scale development should include as much competition
as possible. In many cases this may not be feasible. At any
rate, the basic design configuration becomes more firm, allow-
ing goals to be set for various subsystems. Contracts now
become more explicit in their requirements and flexibility
diminishes. Special attention can now be given to tracking
procedures and any required incentives. The incentives needed
depend upon the level of competition. Incentive or award fees
in the range of three to five percent may be needed if no
competition exists.
Initial production should be priced at DTC targets
determined from the development phases. This is indeed the
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test needed to determine whether DTC goals have been actually
achieved. Tracking of costs should again use the contractor's
management information system (MIS) as much as practicable.
C. SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5000.1
The Navy's formal reply to DOD ' s sweeping procurement
reforms came in March of 1972 and provided a far more detailed
and specialized guidance (Ref. 15). Due emphasis was given
to maximum practicable decentralization of authority and
responsibility. Emphasizing flexibility, any unnecessary
restrictions on management are to be avoided. Program charter
authority is granted by the Chief of Naval Material, normally
to a Systems Command (SYSCOM) . Chartered program managers
hold the rank of at least captain/colonel. Bounds of authority
are explicitly stated in the charter. Any instructions from
program managers must be passed via contracting officers.
Field activities and laboratories are tasked with providing
necessary support.
Cost parameters address LCC goals and are equal in impor-
tance to technical inputs. Again, tradeoffs are required
between all these factors. In addition, consideration is
given to impacts upon the national economy. Cost estimates
follow the MIL STD 881 format to third level WBS elements.
In addition, operational and integrated logistic support (ILS)
data is introduced as appropriate. All estimates are subject
to the reviews of another disinterested organization. Any




Industrial aid should be solicited in drawing up RFP's.
Special care must be given, however, to protect any propri-
etary data. Technical transfusion is promoted only where
necessary. This may be done by encouraging joint agreements
between companies. Such cooperation is not mandatory.
Finally, full understanding by industry of tradeoff factors
and competitive selection criteria is absolutely essential.
Tracking procedures are in accordance with Cost/Schedule
Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC)
.
D. PHILOSOPHY CHANGE
The reforms described above involved a difficult transi-
tion for the services. DOD Directive 5000.1 was issued on
13 July 1971 and allowed only ninety days for implementation.
SECNAVINST 5000.1 was issued 13 March 1972, some eight months
later. This document still addressed DTC largely in gener-
alities. The Joint Design- to-Cost Guide was finally completed
on 3 October 1973, nearly two years later than specified by
OSD. The Guide admits: "Its basic intent is to identify
what should be done with only a general approach of how to
do it." Ostensibly, this would allow a great deal of flexi-
bility. In actual practice, however, this has resulted in
widespread confusion and uncertainty. The several authori-
tative sources still have not agreed upon how to use LCC in
the determination of the DTC goals. Motivation to design to
LCC is reduced since DSARC has agreed to accept UPC targets.
In the background remains a large degree of skepticism as
to whether the concept is even viable (Ref. 11). In this
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environment of stated generalities and uncertain direction
the individual projects must grope along by themselves.
The recent emphasis upon cost is a foreign concept to DOD
procurement. Traditional imputs to programs came largely
from technical and intelligence communities. Cost was not
a major factor. Today, however, costs may have become the
dominant consideration (Ref. 16). Emphasis has shifted from
merely justifying cost increases, to their reduction or total
elimination. Perhaps most notable is the shift in ideals
away from providing the best weaponry possible (Ref. 7).
Rather than specifying the highest performance attainable,
goals are set in bands with minimum acceptable output levels
as the lower end and the desired performance characteristics
at the upper end. Tradeoffs are made for any improvements
between these levels.
Decentralized decision making authority is a major depart-
ure from PPB tradition. As a result, individual project
managers are to be given increased influence to accomplish
their program objectives. Managers now have the authority
to approve tradeoffs in technical and financial areas as
contractors proceed with design iterations. Another result
is the reduced paperwork and reporting requirement. This
should now allow more time for these added management activ-
ities. Many of the diverse problems that now habitually arise
do not have precise, school-type solutions. Greatly increased
status for the project manager is needed to meet these chal-
lenges. Program managers are still bound by overall policy.
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All instructions from managers must be formally passed by
appropriate contracting officers. In the case of any dis-
agreements concerning policy, the decision of the project
manager is regarded as binding, pending appeals (Ref. 15).
Specification procedures are changing drastically in
nature. Rigid "how to do it" specifications are being re-
duced in number to the minimum necessary. Instead, information
is provided concerning desired performance goals. Minimum
performance levels set by DSARC may not be violated without
DSARC review and formal OSD approval. As mentioned before,
tradeoffs must be made above these minimum levels to achieve
increased efficiency. This is the most critical area for cost
reductions. All ECP's must be priced before they are considered
for implementation. A historical inability to make these
tradeoff decisions was instrumental in the serious problems
faced by programs like the C-5A and MBT-70 (Ref. 17). Per-
formance specifications such as these now being implemented
in DOD have been common in commercial industry for many years,
and have helped guarantee the manufacture of desired products
(Ref. 18). This specification procedure has provided the
necessary freedom for designers to explore innovative approaches
to problems. Special care must be applied in drawing up re-
quirements and clearly specifying what is needed. Outputs
must be quantifiable. In addition, criteria for weighting
tradeoff areas must be stated unambiguously.
Competition has received a new emphasis in DOD procure-
ment. Competitive motivations have been recognized as the
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most important driving force in the commercial world (Ref. 18).
Past reliance upon total package procurement tended to dis-
regard this idea. Initial competition existed for source
selection; however, as the project progressed, problems often
appeared, relating either to limitations of the designer-
producer or to his approach. Having no other alternative,
the buyer was faced with having to live with the situation
as best he could. In addition, total package procurement did
not allow a wide measure of specialization, as may be found
in the different types of companies now in existence. Instead,
only one company was designated to handle all the varying
demands and requirements, both technical and managerial, as
a major project moved from conception to full production.
Design- to-Cost philosophy seeks to extend competition as far
as possible in the procurement cycle. Hardware competition
may be extended throughout development phases. The "fly
before buy" approach permits a direct comparison of prototype
performance, eliminating much analytical guesswork and error
involved in selection of proposals (Ref. 19). Separate con-
tracts should be negotiated for each phase of development and
production (Ref. 9). In this way, the developer of a system
is not necessarily guaranteed the following production con-
tract. This increasing emphasis upon competition is expected
to have profound effects upon contractor motivations and
attitudes
.
Competition and tradeoff analysis requires increased
investments of both time and money. This competition often
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involves substantial duplication of efforts, requiring large
financial outlays. These outlays should be in the form of
cost reimbursement type contracts. Fixed price contracts
tend to limit long, detailed, and expensive tradeoff analysis.
It is felt that very large profit incentives, perhaps as high
as twenty to twenty-five percent, may be justified for meeting
DTC goals, in order to reduce long term overall costs (Ref. 20)
Development timetables must be extended, especially in early
stages, in order to adequately explore technical risk areas.
Experience has shown that corrections required to rectify
problems escalate rapidly in both time and cost as develop-
ment proceeds. The costly nature of delayed changes greatly
reduces tradeoff capability.
E. COMMERCIAL APPLICATION
The introduction of DTC into DOD procurement policy has
been looked upon as simply borrowing a page from the note-
book of commercial industry (Ref. 7). The business world,
where money is truly a scarce resource, gives a detailed cost
analysis to all its actions. Thus, DTC may be regarded as
intrinsic to civilian industry. Lessons derived here from
long experience may serve as valuable aids for introducing
DTC into government procurement.
In a growing industrial economy, companies are often
faced with having to acquire new or specialized products
which are not available "off the shelf." In order to meet
these needs, the requirement is first stated in the most
general of terms. This action allows focus upon what general
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type of product is needed. Prematurely locking into a
specific approach may thereby be avoided. Specifications
are then drawn up to meet these needs. These specifications
may be very precise in nature and involve detailed drawings,
blueprints, and specified materials. In some cases, even a
set of required production techniques may be specified.
These detailed requirements have been found to be most suit-
able for relatively simple items. Since these specifications
are given to the producer, the burden for proper design is
placed upon the buyer. He has no guarantee of satisfactory
product performance. At the other extreme, one finds gener-
alized performance specifications. These may consist of
little more than a "black box" with designated inputs, out-
puts, and interface parameters (including size, maintenance,
environment, etc.). This specification format is especially
useful when a proposed product is not well defined. The
burden for proper design in this case is now placed upon the
seller. Guaranteed performance may thus be assured.
Ultimate cost considerations are an early program input.
These considerations may hinge upon the potential market value
of the product, value to the buyer, or upon some arbitrary
budgetary limitation. These limits are not necessarily the
same. Competition may also influence cost levels. Additional
considerations of performance and delivery schedule have a
bearing upon ultimate source selection. Competitive negoti-
ations are then commenced to determine this source of supply.
The search for suppliers may include internal as well as
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outside sources. The final decision is based upon which
supplier can provide the greatest overall benefit to the
buyer. No other restrictions should be allowed (Ref. 18).
The commercial world views DTC as management of design,
development, production, and "life support" expenses in such
a manner as to meet a marketplace value to a user (Ref. 19).
Design engineers must conduct their work in anticipation of
future market environments as well as meeting today's needs.
Special emphasis is given to areas of technology, product
value, projected price levels, and competitive market struc-
ture. Competition may extend through the entire procurement
cycle, from initial conception to follow-on parts and service.
Responsiveness to meeting the needs of a buyer provides the
only hope cf financial rewards . The competitive market allow?
the buyer to take his business elsewhere if one selected
producer cannot perform. Competition is thus a powerful
driving influence toward efficient practices
.
As the development of a product progresses, several
decision parameters come under consideration. These include
design requirements, cost estimates, tradeoffs between them,
and general resource allocation. The project manager is
responsible for all these areas except the last. Higher
management deals with resource allocations and conducts
periodic reviews of project team efforts, comparing them
with overall corporate goals. Because of the diverse nature
of these responsibilities, it is important that project man-
agers be flexible and well trained to handle them. Tradeoff
decisions made by project management are crucial to overall
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project success. It is important that the project manager
be responsible and have direct access to top level management,
High level support, understanding, and trust are essential to
the continued well being of project team efforts.
The membership of the project team is normally hand
selected to be small, highly competent, and cohesive. The
different personalities and talents must be integrated into
a team capable of acting quickly and decisively regarding new
and constantly changing information. Engineering provides
technical inputs concerning what can be made and how to make
it. Marketing provides information concerning what can be
sold. The comptroller's office provides overall financial
constraint data. These inputs provide a data base for design
changes and iterations. These changes may include slight
modification of an existing plan, or they might entail sweep-
ing conceptual revisions. The team constantly probes for
possible modifications to performance, cost, or schedule.
Nothing should be regarded as untouchable.
Personnel policies are regarded as a key to overall pro-
ject team success. To maintain coherency, management changes
are avoided, especially during major development phases. If,
for some reason, the manager must be replaced, the successor
is chosen from within the team membership. Other promotions
will stay within the development team as much as practicable.
In this way a true team identity is formed. The knowledge
and experience derived as projects develop are conserved and
membership can keep abreast of the latest happenings.
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It would appear that DTC, as applied in commercial
business, has several policy ramifications that ought to be
given careful consideration within DOD.
F. GOALS
The setting of quantifiable performance objectives
relating to a proposed weapons system and the determination
of measurable costs to be incurred in maintaining such per-
formance objectives is at the heart of any complete weapons
system analysis (Ref . 21) . Realistic, but challenging goals
are essential. If too easily attainable, industry is not
sufficiently challenged to produce its best efforts, Unreal-
istically stringent thresholds, on the other hand, will
destroy motivation to produce anything useful. The manner
in which performance and cost goals are selected is briefly
examined below.
1 . Performance Goals
The intent of any major weapons system procurement is
to provide a countermeasure for a specific threat. Because
of the diversity of systems developed, and the problems they
address, it is not within the scope of this research to
attempt to draw up a comprehensive set of guidelines for all
cases. Detailed design specifications are being replaced by
comprehensive performance requirements. Two major consider-
ations in the selection of these performance requirements
stand out: Are such goals achievable? Are such goals
affordable? A third consideration seeks to avoid large
increases in marginal costs for a relatively small increase
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in performance level. In order to intelligently assess these
areas, a wide diversity of inputs will be required to deter-
mine system parameters. These inputs must come from industry
sources as well as government planners. Such a partnership
will avoid many of the limitations facing each party indi-
vidually. Technological and operational complexities have
grown so great that no single institution can go it alone.
2. Cost Goals
As noted earlier, cost has not always been an initial
parameter in the definition and selection of weapons systems.
The imposition of cost parameters has revolutionized procure-
ment strategies. Several types of growing pains have accom-
panied this transition period. There seems to be a general
agreement within the upper echelons of DOT) that cost goals
should be determined by system average unit costs. The
makeup of this cost goal has been the subject of confusion
and controversy. DOD Directive 5000.1 declared that LCC
should be the ultimate DTC goal. In practice, however, UPC
has become the goal. Such actions have met the approval of
DSARC. Some thinkers feel that designing to UPC implies
simplicity and thereby contributes to lower LCC (Ref. 12).
Other sources disagree (Ref. 22). Approaches to even UPC
have been found to vary considerably. As shown later, UPC
may include both recurring and non-recurring costs. Other
cases included only overall recurring costs. Still other
cases addressed only recurring hardware costs. Even non-
recurring costs have been subject to manipulations (Ref. 23).
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It is apparent that no meaningful contract may be drawn up
without clear agreement by all parties involved as to the
precise makeup and definitions of cost goals (Ref. 12).
A variety of methods has been proposed for setting
cost goals. One such approach sets the price at the same
level as the system to be replaced, challenging designers
to use improved technology to come up with a better product.
Such a goal is arbitrary and there is no reason to believe
that this is actually the optimum price level. Akin to this
approach is the determination of the total budget available
for a system type and the number of systems needed. One
simply divides the budget by the number of systems to define
unit costs. Again, such costs are arbitrary in nature. The
industrial engineering estimate has historically been used
to define the costs of a complete system from a "ground up"
approach. This approach attempts to identify and cost all
items comprising a proposed system, operations involved in
putting it together, and any other costs related to deploy-
ment. Obviously, a great deal must be known about this system
before such an approach may be used effectively. This is not
possible for a new and undefined system. The historical cost
of a system analogous to one being proposed may be helpful
in some cases. This similarity in cost, however, can be no
better than the analogy between systems built at different
times and under different conditions (Ref. 24). Late 1971
saw the imposition of parametric cost estimating procedures





Parametric CER's attempt to relate performance and
technical parameters of a proposed system to a projected cost
level. These relationships are developed from regression
equations based upon historical data. The equations, them-
selves, are developed through trial and error curve fit to
this empirical data. Although still a relatively new art,
cost estimating accuracies within +_ 10% may be attainable
(Ref . 9) . Interviews with members of the Cost Analysis
Division at NWC, China Lake indicated that such optimism
may be premature. Practitioners in the field are currently
satisfied with estimates within 20 to 30% of actual cost.
Nevertheless, these estimates are vastly superior to 200 to
3001 errors resulting from earlier "ground up" cost approaches
(Ref. 9). Aggregated historical data includes actual experi-
ence and includes many costs often ignored by older techniques
(general administration, profit, maintenance § support, per-
sonnel training § equipment, service personnel, test § evalua-
tion, systems engineering, reporting data, initial spares,
overhaul, etc.). Historical data includes past failures and
problem areas, while industrial engineering approaches tend
to be more optimistic. Furthermore, parametric CER's provide
data concerning cost uncertainty and confidence levels,
rather than solely providing precise, but incorrect solutions.
Parametric CER's furnish their greatest benefits
during the earlier stages of development (Ref. 26). Early
conceptual studies have little, if anything, in the way of
true design information. Application of CER's provides rough
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cost envelopes to aid in design selection. Consistent
relationships allow direct comparisons between alternatives
.
Ease of rapid programming is helpful in tradeoff sensitivity-
analysis. The cost goals postulated from this stage promise
to be more realistic than heretofore. As the design progresses,
an overall WBS begins to take form, providing a framework for
subsystem study. Tradeoff sensitivities relating cost and
performance of components may now be examined. These esti-
mates aid in selecting overall design configurations.
Comparisons can be made between CER's and industrial engineer-
ing approaches to check the validity of each. Agreement
results in increased confidence in both estimates. Any areas
of disagreement can then be studied and resolved.
The major difficulty associated with developing CER's
is the acute shortage of necessary historical data (Ref. 26).
This is due largely to accounting procedures. Life cycle
estimates are especially hard hit by this problem. Only
aggregate information is available. Effects of program
changes (schedule, ECP, etc.) cannot normally be isolated.
Proposed CER's can be verified only against competing CER's
or industrial engineering techniques. Much has to be learned
here
.
Several criticisms are leveled at applying the CER
approach. In most cases the aggregated information cannot
be directly related to subsystems. Prior inefficiencies may
be perpetuated, rather than corrected. Most disturbing,
there does not appear to be any analytic relationship to
4 9

real life occurrences. To the layman this approach may
appear to be an application of statistical analysis to draw
a mathematically precise line from an unwarranted assumption
to a foregone conclusion. Perhaps the best defense of the
CER approach is that, in spite of all its intellectually
aesthetic shortcomings, it does seem to work.
Cost information, from whatever source, is now a major
criterion in determination of overall system desirability.
To be truly effective, cost considerations should be included
in the DCP (Ref . 27) . Cost is thereby made simply another
system parameter. The insertion of any such parameter, after
design has begun, adversely affects efficiency.. Several
sources of independent cost estimates are being developed.
Each weapons project, office is tasked with developing its
own estimate. In addition, government laboratories may
provide assistance to projects and help to validate these
estimates. Each service follows with its own cost estimate.
Finally, DOD has formed its own cost estimating organization,
Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) , to aid DSARC in its
review capacity. The many autonomous groups within DOD that
are developing independent CER capabilities should aid in
the rapid development of a realistic cost projection capa-
bility.
G. TRADEOFFS
The area of tradeoffs between various development param-
eters is the most distinguishing feature of the DTC approach.
This new tack should not be confused with the established
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policy of Value Engineering (VE) . Past application of VE
has attempted to define lower cost approaches to perform
a given function. Output performance was not normally
permitted to vary. Introduction of DTC has made cost an
equal parameter with output. Both cost and performance may
be traded off with one another to achieve a more efficient
overall approach (Ref . 18) . Minimum performance levels,
however, are not to be compromised. Specifications defining
these minimum levels must be justified before inclusion in
RFP's and contracts (Ref. 27). Overall costs, facing a
similar constraint, are now limited to a maximum ceiling
which cannot be violated (Ref. 28).
Wide ranges of flexibility should be available to con-
tractors . Broad perxormance specifications , ratucr tnan ^c
tailed blueprints, are being used to define weapons systems.
Any remaining use of MIL SPECS must be fully justified
(Ref. 27). Contractors are tasked with providing a large
measure of their own cost-benefit analysis. Little textbook
type information is now available. Each project presents
unique problems. Intelligent and decisive leadership is
critical to both contractor and DOD personnel. Project
managers must be well trained, capable, and experienced in
order to cope with wide ranging responsibilities. New pro-
posed tradeoffs must be reviewed quickly by a higher manage-
ment which is responsive to change.
Industry must be fully informed concerning the bounds of
its freedom and how best to ;ipp]y it. The various requirements
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must be ranked in some manner. Contractors may
find them-
selves attempting to make operational type decisions.
Relationships must then be provided so that designers
can
correlate marginal costs with marginal benefits.
The
Government is tasked with specifying the marginal
benefits
for each area of tradeoffs (Ref. 29). Continued
close com-
munication with DOD will be needed throughout
development
in order to understand and expeditiously dispose
of tradeoff
proposals (Ref. 12).
A system must be set up for defining who is
responsible
for making and approving each particular type
of tradeoff.
Such a rule should make allowances for the
size and nature
of changes. Levels of tradeoff approval may
be as low as the
..
4^-.- manner f r relatively minor revisions.contractu! m fiujocu ffidu<*i,ci , -^-
On the other hand, OSD approval may be needed
for major changes
in parameters. Review authority should be no
higher than that
needed for an adequate judgement of benefits (Ref. 29).
Con-
sideration must be given, however, to the cumulative
nature
of changes. A large number of minor alterations
may in fact
have results of major proportions.
Another important area of tradeoffs deals with
early R§D
expenditures as opposed to other components of LCC.
Greater
investments in early program phases would tend to
help lower
later costs through continued design improvements.
There is
a point, however, where the marginal benefits
of such R?,D
expenditures will decrease. Finally, a point will
be reached




other LCC elements. Investment beyond this point is wasteful.
At present there does not appear to be an explicit solution
to this problem.
The benefits of commercial world experience seem to have
been helpful. Those contractors with a history of dealing
largely with a commercial market for their sales tend to be
more cost conscious. This has been demonstrated by a better
capacity to make intelligent tradeoff decisions (Ref. 21).
The Government must now attempt to force this cost conscious
attitude upon all its suppliers. Easy money days appear to
be gone forever.
H. REACTIONS TO IMPOSITION OF DESIGN-TO-COST
The response to the compulsory introduction of DTC upon
DOD procurement has been mixed. Interviews held with program
engineers and administrators at NWC, China Lake seemed to
indicate that reactions to DTC depended largely upon the
stage of program development. Those projects which saw the
addition of DTC requirements in early conceptual stages
viewed it as just another design parameter. This requirement
presented an engineering challenge and, as such, was well
received, once developers saw cost as a valid constraint.
Those programs which have moved farther along in their evolu-
tion and had DTC applied retroactively viewed it less favorably
Designs have, in many cases, become firm. bong range planning
has been laid out. Proper implementation of DTC would require
a whole new development effort in order to optimize cost along
with all the other constraints. Suddenly changing the rules
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after the game has begun was viewed by some as unnecessary
harassment. As such, DTC has received little more than lip
service in these cases.
Civilian contractors have, in some cases, modified their
management approaches to accommodate DTC (Ref . 30) . In the
past, cost information was not normally available to engineers.
Apparently, this was done to avoid stifling design creativity.
Now, however, some contractors are providing engineers de-
tailed cost breakdoim sheets to help them become aware of
cost ramifications relating to design techniques. Manage-
ment is encouraging engineers to pursue promising, but
unusual, approaches to problems. To eliminate long delays
caused by reviewing designs, engineers are being told, "Be
sure you're right and then go ahead." Emphasizing flexibil-
ity, designers are told not to "fall in love" with their
efforts. Nothing is immune to change. Morale within the
manufacturing departments appears to be rising as their cost
feedback helps drive designs. Production personnel are also
being challenged to provide improvements.
Not everyone feels this way, however. There appears to be
substantial fear and skepticism resulting from such freedom
to trade away performance. Others with a "this too shall
pass" attitude see DTC as just another spasmodic attempt by
DOD to heal its incurable procurement ills (Ref. 30). Some
contractors are afraid to submit what they feel are excellent
designs that merit considcra Lion , but still fall short of a
threshold, for fear of being declared unresponsive. Others see
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the DTC problem as attempting to maximize performance subject
to a budgetary constraint. Cost is not being traded off
CRef . 31)
.
These mixed feelings and misunderstandings must be
properly addressed and dealt with if DTC is to receive a
fair test as a procurement strategy.
I. PROBLEMS AND CRITICISMS
The formal introduction of DTC upon DOD occurred in mid
1971. Since that time there has been much written describing
difficulties associated with how DTC is being applied.
Several of the criticisms described below have applied to
prior procurement techniques as well as to DTC. These are
ills seemingly related to DOD procurement as a whole. Other
difficulties apply only to DTC as it is currently done.
1. Problems Related to Finance
Single-year funding procedures used by .Congress have
had an adverse impact upon weapons procurement (Ref. 19).
Money is provided only on a yearly basis, with no guarantee
of what the future holds. As a result, managers tend to look
only at current program phases. Being ignorant of what
future funding levels will be, program managers are not in
a position to intelligently plan very far in advance. Such
long range planning, if it does exist, is not done as care-
fully as it should be. Delayed appropriations may cause work
stoppage. Contractors, however, continue to incur expenses,
adding to weapons costs. Line item budgets greatly hamper





to obtain approval for programs, optimistic cost estimates
y be supplied by both contractors and the services. In
any cases, R§D expenditures are cut back. Such actions
often return and haunt a program through its entire life.
Contractor revenues are still related primarily to
the costs they incur. Cutting back expenses, especially
during R§D phases, may result in decreased revenues for the
contractor. Thus, one may find a developer, who has cash
flow difficulties, having incentives to increase costs.
Any money that is saved through prudent project
management is not normally available for other uses. Such
funds are thereby effectively lost to the service. This
depresses motivation to pursue an active cost control program.
Programs involved in developmental work have a
requirement for substantial management reserves. In many
cases, however, such funding reserves are denied to management
(Ref. 32). Contracts often make no provisions for reserves.
Program managers may find contractual reserves denied, either
because they were not authorized, or the money was removed
for other uses. Thus, potential cost reduction ideas may not
be suitably funded. Overall costs thereby become unnecessar-
ily high.
2 . Problems Related to Source Selection
Government selection of contractors is greatly limited
by policy and statuatory requirements (Ref. 18). Legislation
has explicitly favored U.S. firms, small businesses, minority
enterprises, depressed areas, and other special interests.
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Other laws affect safety standards, pay scales, pricing data,
and discrimination policies of government contractors (Ref.
33). Such laws, while intended to serve some economic or
social good, tend to restrict potential sources and eliminate
competition.
Competition, if it does indeed exist, is largely
eliminated once a program is commenced (Ref. 19). The sit-
uation then arises where the market consists of one buyer
and one seller. Negotiations at this point tend to center
about financial areas. It is generally felt that competition
for a contract threatens a company with a loss of business,
affecting its stability, and is, therefore, a far stronger
stimulus than is the profit incentive. Although separate
contracts must be written for each phase, the contractor who
did the last development work holds a distinct competitive
advantage. The situation that now arises begins to strongly
resemble total package procurement. The problem of the
"buy in" has thus yet to be solved.
3 . Problems Related to Requirements
Although DTC has emphasized the use of performance
specifications, there is still widespread usage of MIL SPECS
and other detailed specifications (Ref. 32). These restric-
tions continue to hamper R^D efforts and restrain creativity.
As a result, the beginning phases of development require many
program changes. Change approvals, however, continue to




Competitive selection criteria are not being adequately
communicated to contractors (Ref. 32). Underlying statements
of needs are not provided. Intelligent tradeoffs to meet
these needs are thereby curtailed. Such information is
especially critical during conceptual stages.
Proper drawing up of RFP's and goals requires inputs
from the industrial world. Free exchange of information
between contractors and DOD poses problems with respect to
the protection of unique approaches and proprietary data.
Conflicts are especially noteworthy in areas where the
Government has helped to fund R^D efforts.
There has been a conflict in desires between the
originality sought by DTC and the standardization and sim-
plified logistics given by use of GFE. There is no guar-
antee that GFE is necessarily the best or cheapest available.
Obviously, there is a tradeoff to be made in this area.
Procudures for handling this problem do not seem to be
clearly defined (Ref. 32)
.
The changed reporting requirements relating to DTC
have had profound implications upon contractor accounting
and management information systems (MIS). Most industrial
accounting and management procedures have historically been
geared to look back and justify past expenditures, rather
than to look ahead and plan future activities (Ref. 19).
Recent directives have dictated usage of the existing MIS
as much as possible in tracking DTC. The forward- lookJ ng
nature of this requirement, combined with the rearward- looking
MIS poses yet another set of problems.
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4 . Problems Related to Project Management
Military project managers and their project teams are
often selected long after the project itself has commenced
(Ref. 19). The project team arrives on the scene to find
most program parameters already firmly set. Proper handling
of decisions and changes is most critical in the conceptual
stages. At this time, however, there is no single person in
charge of the project. Change procedures are ill defined
and require massive documentation. Long turn-around times
for ECP's drastically limit the amount of tradeoff analysis
and the numbers of design iterations. This impacts adversely
upon project optimization.
Project managers in the commercial world are given
a great deal of authority to determine the course and scope
of project development. This is not the case within DOD.
High visibility to both press and Congress has resulted in
extensive decision review and excessive paperwork demands.
The lengthy review delays timely decisions. In addition,
heavy paperwork and public affairs responsibilities detract
measurably from the time available for actual management
duties. Lengthy lines of communication within the DOD
bureaucracy have led to conflicting policy interpretations
and confusion. Such actions as may be directed by the
project manager must pass via, and be approved by, contracting
officers, who belong to a different bureaucracy with a dif-




Rotation and tenure of_program managers have posed
a series of problems (Ref . 19) . The manager, regardless of
competence, rotates quickly in and out of his job before he
can become familiar with it, or see the results of his efforts,
The rotation schedule is arbitrary. The manager may leave
or enter at a critical phase of the program. Thus, the man
in change never really is aware of what is happening. He
must deal with an entrenched bureaucracy that will be around
long after he is gone. Project managers are often line
officers having wide operational experience but little train-
ing applicable to the project environment. This inexperience,
coupled with rapid rotation, has resulted in many restric-
tions, regulations, and other forms of management by document.
The military structure, intended to preserve discipline and
standardization, has been accused of stifling innovation,
initiative, and risk taking. Emphasis appears to be upon
accountability and control rather than efficiency and effec-
tiveness. <,
5 . Problems Related to Emphasis Level of Life Cycle Cost
DOD Directive 5000.1 envisioned DTC as being applied
to LCC reduction. Practically speaking, however, UPC has
received far more attention. LCC projections require far
more time and experience to verify. Finally, DSARC has agreed
to accept UPC goals as at least an interim solution.
Past experience has shown, however, that for many
systems the visible support costs over a ten-year life span
range from three to ten tiroes the acquisition costs (Ref. 34).
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It is in the best interests of the government to place far
more emphasis upon LCC than it has done in the past. Data
shortages have made LCC projections quite difficult to make.
Lack of short term verification discourages LCC as a design
parameter. Contractors in danger of overrunning costs will
place special emphasis upon UPC to escape criticism or
threats of program termination. Finally, a detailed usage
and support plan for a piece of military equipment having a
lifetime of many years is very difficult to define. The
many political, military, and economic contingencies possibly
facing a weapon system over a period of ten to twenty years
cannot be enumerated. Without a preplanned usage agreement,
LCC projections are meaningless. There appears to be little




DOD Directive 5000.1 imposes the Design- to-Cost require-
ment upon all major weapons systems currently under develop-
ment. Most systems reaching operational status at this time
had the Design- to-Cost requirements forced upon them as a
retrofit, after initial R§D contracts were awarded. As a
result of this retrofitting, a true picture of the effective-
ness of DTC is difficult to measure. The programs which
included DTC from their conception have not yet become
operational. For these reasons, a comprehensive evaluation
of the effects of DTC is not currently attainable. Trends
have been established, however, which may indicate the value
of DTC and potential problem areas and limitations.
The following case studies present the various techniques
in which Design- to-Cost has been implemented in recent DOD
aerospace programs. This selection, while not exhaustive,
does provide a sample of recent attempts to apply the re-
quirements of DOD Directive 5000.1. Cases presented include:
Air Force Close Air Support Aircraft
Army Advanced Attack Helicopter
Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System
SAM-D Missile
Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy
Lightweight Fighter
Navy Lightweight Fighter
NWC, China Lake Projects
The cases presented vary considerably in scope and
detail. This is largely due to the relative availability
of data. These limitations facing the authors stemmed from
02

geographic constraints, data sensitivity, contract avail-
ability, security classification, or political considerations.
Furthermore, several redundant aspects common to more than
one program are not continually duplicated.
A. AIR FORCE CLOSE AIR SUPPORT AIRCRAFT (A-10)
1 . Background
The Air Force began development of the requirements
for a close air support (CAS) aircraft in 1966. To accomplish
this, six contractors were funded between 1966 and 1970 to
develop Concept Formulation Packages (CFP) . These CFPs
were intended to define aircraft performance parameters to
best satisfy the CAS mission. Using the results of parametric
cost analysis studies, a unit recurring flyaway cost of $1.2
million (FY '70 dollars) was established. The program en-
tailed the procurement of 600 aircraft to be purchased at a
rate of twenty aircraft per month (Ref. 35). The cost
estimate was based on the assumption the aircraft would use
a turboprop propulsion system rather than a turbojet or
turbofan. This was due to the non-availability of a small
turbojet or turbofan engine in the 9,000 pound thrust class,
during the formulation study period. Subsequently, a turbojet
in this thrust class was developed. The Air Force increased
the cost estimate to $1.4 million to encourage contractors
to incorporate this new engine. The turbofan is slightly
more expensive than the other types; however, it has better
fuel economy, reliability, and maintainability. The cost
target was again increased to $1.5 million per aircraft to
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include non-recurring costs such as initial tooling and
work set up.
In the spring of 1970, the Air Force received author-
ity to prepare a RFP for the CAS weapons system. At this
time the project was designated the AX program. Competitive
prototype phase (CPP) solicitations were requested from
eleven aircraft producers . After four months devoted to
source selection, then Secretary of the Air Force Seamans,
in December 1970, authorized CPP firm fixed price contracts
to be awarded for the development of two prototype aircraft
each from Northrop Corporation for the A-9 and Fairchild
Industries, Fairchild Republic Division for the A-10. The
contract price was the same as requested in contractor pro-
posals. Fairchild asked for and received about $12.0 million
more than Northrop because they intended to design and manu-
facture from the start a prototype that was in essence a
pre-production aircraft (Ref. 36). Two years later, in
January 1973, following the competitive Air Force flight
evaluation of the full scale development and production pro-
posals, Fairchild Republic was selected to develop the A-10
for the CAS role. There was considerable Congressional
debate as to the legitimacy of the award. Northrop 's entry
was potentially less expensive ($50,000 - $100,000 per
aircraft), mainly because of less costly Avco Lycoming
engines. However, Fairchild 's prototyping was a key element
in the Air Force selection of the A-10 (Ref. 37). Fairchild
Republic was awarded a cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contract
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to build ten pre-production aircraft on a negotiated schedule
The incentive was for cost reduction alone, not for increas-
ing performance. Congress cut the order to six pre-produc-
tion aircraft in 1974 (Ref . 38) . The Air Force negotiated
a fixed price option for two aircraft buys. The first option
was for between 22 and 39 aircraft. The second was for
between 11 and 33. At this time the Air Force has elected
to receive 26 from the first and 22 from the second (Ref. 39)
The first production aircraft delivery date has been set for
December 1975.
2 . Design- to-Cost Contract Features
There are four primary subsystems of the A-10. Of
these, three were contracted for by the A-10 Systems Program
Office (SPO) at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. These
were (Ref. 40)
:
(1) Airframe and total system integration with Fairchild
Republic Division, Fairchild Industries, Farmingdale,
New York (prime contractor)
(2) TF-34-100 Engines with Aircraft Engine Group, General
Electric Company, Lynn, Massachusetts
(3) GAU-8/A 33mm Gun with Armament Department, General
Electric Company
The fourth subsystem, the avionics group, is not being pro-
cured through the A-10 SPO. This is being furnished as GFE.
Each of the contracts prepared at the A-10 SPO includes
Design - to-Cost clauses as a special feature of a cost type
contract. Since the three contracts were similar in nature,
only the prime contract will be expounded upon. The main
Design - to-Cost clause reads in part:
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"DESIGN TO UNIT FLY-AWAY COST
a) Unit production fly-away costs are defined as the
sum of all recurring and non-recurring costs (excluding
all RDT^E costs) necessary to produce a complete aircraft,
including the applicable portion of system engineering
and program management. This definition excludes all
costs associated with the production of AGE (aircraft
ground support equipment), Training, Data, Initial
Spares and the applicable portion of system engineering
and program management . . .
b) A prime objective during Full-Scale Development
is to design to a cumulative average unit production fly-
away cost of $1.5 million expressed in FY 1970 dollars
for a total of 600 aircraft ... to attain a maximum
rate of 20 aircraft per month." (Ref. 41).
Engineering Change Orders (ECO) are included in both the
recurring and the non-recurring costs. The contractor is
held responsible to control and track his portions of the
costs and to report any cost changes over $5,000 on the
Monthly Cost Performance Report in both current and FY '70
dollars. He is also to report any actions or tradeoffs he
proposes to take to bring the costs back within the limit.
The breakdown for the recurring costs is shown in Table III
(from Ref. 42)
.
It is apparent from the contract that the unit pro-
duction fly-away costs include only a portion of the total
life cycle costs. The major exclusions, besides RDT^E and
the others listed above, are operation and maintenance costs.
There are several significant points which should be noted.
(1) A $1.5 mi llion target cost is specified to give the
contractor a definite cost figure for which to design
and evaluate tradeoffs.
(2) The uncertainty of inflation will not affect the cost
goal because it is expressed in con stant, do llars .
This is important since the last aircraft is scheduled
for delivery in early 1978 (Kef. 45).
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(3) A design goal of 600 aircraft is established so
that production costs and the learning curve savings
could be calculated and averaged out.
(4) The design production rate is specified. This
allows for the development of an economical produc-
tion system geared to this rate. Any change either
to increase or decrease the rate would affect the
cost.
(5) Including the costs of ECO in the $1.5 million limit
insures that the contractor maintain a reserve for
this purpose.
There are also a number of other special clauses in
the contracts. These clauses identify the:
(1) limitation of government obligation
(2) government options
(3) life cycle cost responsibilities
(4) award fee provisions
(5) changing and allocation of costs
(6) system integration responsibilities and
demonstration milestones.
TABLE III




Airframe (CFE) 805.1 57.4
Labor 354.2 25.3










600 Aircraft: Units No. 11 through 610
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The costs applicable to the Design-to- Cost goals
must be separately collected, recorded, and reported. The
Total System Integration Responsibility clause makes Fair-
child responsible to insure the entire system cost remains
within the $1.5 million cost goal. This means Fairchild
must monitor subcontractors' costs as well as its own. How-
ever, unlike the Total System Performance Responsibility
clause used in other major weapon system contracts, Fairchild
is required to accept and integrate all GFE, but only to
insure that the GFE performs to its specifications rather
than to total system specifications. The life cycle cost
clause insures that tradeoffs in performance will be weighed
against their impact on life cycle costs. Changes in design
will be made only if tbev reduce both unit cost and life
cycle costs. Failure on the part of Fairchild to meet the
Design- to-Cost goal in any of the areas discussed could
result in possible contract termination (Ref. 43).
3 . Design Tradeoffs
The RFP for the CPP was carefully prepared to elim-
inate all unnecessary MIL SPEC and MIL STD requirements.
The Design- to-Cost objective was the only requirement stated
in the initial RFP. Performance was stated in terms of goals
in the areas of responsiveness, lethality, survivability, and
simplicity in order to accomplish the CAS mission (Ref. 44).
These changes, coupled with the new concept of Design- to-Cost
in military procurement, left uncertainty as to the importance
of the cost target in the minds of the bidding contractors.
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However, after Air Force briefings these contractors be-
came aware that maximum possible design freedom was left to
the company and that the design had to be within the cost
limit (Ref. 23). Fairchild found it necessary to insist that
subcontractors adopt the same cost conscious attitude and
make tradeoff studies of their own to provide lower cost
options. In order to insure the lowest possible production
costs, Fairchild organized a design team which incorporated
all levels of engineering and manufacturing. The team used
a design approach for the prototype aircraft which would
eliminate as much risk in the production folloxv-on as possible
This included designing as many components as possible to the
production configuration. Tradeoff studies were also con-







6. take off and landing distance
7. landing gear flotation
8. engine thrust level.
As a result of this concept, the following low cost design
and manufacturing techniques were incorporated within the
A-10 (Ref. 45):
(1) Engine: In order to reduce the cost of the TF 34
engine, unneeded features were discarded such as the
Navy required fuel heaters for JP-5 fuel. Many
titanium parts were replaced with steel. These
resulted in a cost savings of $45,000 per engine.
(2) Airframe design: Many features were designed into




a. simple external lines
b. constant cross section fuselage segment
c. single curvature skins
d. simple structural elements
--one-third of the wing span is constant cross
section with straight spars and ribs
--horizontal stabilizer has constant cross
section [18 of 20 ribs are identical)
e. greater than normal protuberance tolerance.
(3) Landing gear: Open landing gear pods arrangement
allows both simplicity and weight savings.
(4) Engine location: The high externally mounted engines
result in a simpler fuselage design, permit easy
access for service and maintenance, and minimize the
danger of foreign object ingestion.
(5) Wing selection: An airfoil with high lift char-
acteristics at low speeds was selected in order
to reduce the necessary wing area and resulted in
a cost savings of about $50,000 per aircraft.
(6) Interchangeable parts: The following major assemblies






f. nacelle inlets and aft section
g. main landing gear
h. stabilizer ribs.
This interchangeability allows for a significant
reduction in production costs and will permit the Air Force
to minimize its spare parts inventory.
Additional production cost savings resulted fron
constructing the prototype aircraft using the same methods
as would be used for the production aircraft. By doing this,
Fairchild used the lessons learned during the prototype
development to save considerable time and money and to avoid
a great deal of risk resulting from production method changes.
Through its experience, Fairchild determined which subassemblies
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to have built up. It could pre-position parts, hardware,
equipment, and men to form a "speed-line," helping to accel-
erate aircraft production. The A-10 program director, Col.
James Hildebrandt added
"There is no question in my mind that the (Fairchild)
A-10 would cost more than $30 million more (in future
development) if it hadn't had competition from the
(Northrup) A-9 (on which the Air Force spent $29 million).
I am quite sure Fairchild would have gone more for opti-
mizing performance if it hadn't had competition to hold
the cost down." (Ref. 46).
This dramatically shows the influence of competition in
holding down costs.
The A-10 program has been a success thus far because
a lot of people have made the right decisions at the right
times. Achievable goals were established early in the
program conception phase. The aircraft requirements were
realistically set. Contractors, managers, and engineers were
kept informed. Through necessary tradeoffs, acceptable per-
formance was provided within a price the Government can
afford to pay.
B. ARMY ADVANCED ATTACK HELICOPTER
The Army authorized development of the advanced attack
helicopter (AAH) in 1972 after comprehensive studies verify-
ing its necessity. The primary mission to be performed by
the aircraft is to supply close air fire support for ground
forces. The helicopter is intended to be a high performance
weapon system to balance the capabilities of lower performance




The performance requirements for the AAH were developed
through comprehensive analysis of anticipated threat envir-
onments and after careful evaluation of the capabilities of
existing and anticipated weapon systems. A study was con-
ducted by the Army to reevaluate and update former require-
ments for the Cheyenne, Advanced Aerial Fire Support System,
which was becoming too expensive for the mission and had
come under attack by Congress. The result of the study was
a recommendation for the AAH. The Material Need document
presented the requirements for the desired performance char-
acteristics, airframe and subsystem configurations, armament
capabilities and payload. These items were derived on a cost
and mission effectiveness basis and were expressed in terms
of performance bands. The lower level of the band represented
the minimum acceptable performance. The desired performance
corresponded to the high end of the band. The cost to achieve
the upper level of performance was estimated to be only 15%
less than the unit fly-away cost of the Cheyenne system, at
that time about $2.7 million per copy (Ref. 47). The Army
and DSARC agreed to design to a goal of $1.4 to $1.6 million
unit recurring fly-away costs. The major design criteria of
the AAH include: (Refs. 47, 48)
--maximum survivability, including reduced radar cross
section, armor protection, self-sealing fuel tanks,
and total structural resistance to small-arms fire
--maneuverability, including exceptional lateral and
vertical performance, side-slip turning, and tight
turning at high speeds
--all weather flight capability to include "nap-of-the-
earth" terrain following allowing popping up to acquire
targets and deliver weapons.
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The specifications for the AAH RFP were carefully
prepared in order to verify that all requirements were valid
and necessary to achieve both the design objective and the
operational requirements. All unnecessary requirements
were eliminated so that the bidding contractors could have
maximum freedom to use their initiatives to design and
develop proposals most advantageous to the Army from a cost,
performance, and schedule point of view. In addition, the
Army asked the bidders "to place major emphasis on cost
reduction through critical examination of performance char-
acteristics, improving producibility and innovative produc-
tion techniques (and) to exercise their judgement and make
tradeoffs to meet the design- to-cost goal" (Ref. 49).
The RFP was released in November 197 2 and was answered








which had done some prior
development on the AH-56 Cheyenne.
-- Boeing Vertol Co. , which is working on the Army UTTAS
.
-- Sikorsky Aircraft Div.
,
United Aircraft Corp., which




After comprehensive evaluation of these proposals,
the Army awarded cost plus incentive fee (CPIF) contracts
with an award fee provision for competitive prototypes to
Bell and Hughes in June 1973. A provision was included
not to proceed until after revalidation (within 30 days).
73

This time was used for reviewing the projected unit costs by
the Army and OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG)
,
and to insure the consistence of the DTC goal with respect
to other cost reporting procedures. The contractors were
to use this time to identify additional cost reduction
possibilities
.
The portion of the contract (Ref. 50) addressing DTC
states :
"The primary objective of this contract is to develop
a cost effective, reliable and easily maintained advanced
attack helicopter system . . . with a unit recurring aver-
age flyaway cost of $1,349,093! or less, including $282, 000 1
design to cost for Associate Contractor equipment. Emphasis
is to be placed on life cycle cost reduction through
producibility of operational design features and maintain-
ability and reliability . . .
"The Contractor's System Specification describes an
aircraft which the contractor expects can be produced
for the cost established above (FY 1972 constant dollars),
based upon the quantity and schedule (confidential). It
is limited to recurring costs . . . which include the
recurring costs of C ontractor furnished subsystems and
the Government furnished material (Emphasis added) .
"
The award fee is an incentive for achievement of the
design to unit production cost. However, the award fee will
be determined unilaterally by the Government and a maximum
amount is stated in the contract. A Sikorsky Aircraft
Division vice president expressed reservations about the
way of rewarding the contract (Ref. 51)
.
Another interesting point of this contract is the
fact that the means for determining fee adjustment was ex-
plicitly stated.
1 For Hughes Helicopter, Hughes Aircraft Company
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"The implicit Price Deflator for the total Gross
National Product (index base 1958 -- 100) published
by the Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis
as reported periodically in the United States Department
of Commerce publication entitled 'Business Conditions
Digest' will be used to adjust current year dollars to
average constant FY 1972 dollars."
The AAH is, however, experiencing cost increases in
excess of funding. As a result, the program is being
stretched. This is expected to increase unit production
costs in future years (Ref. 52). It was expected that a
competitive prototype flyoff will be performed starting in
March 1975, and a contract for engineering development will
be awarded to the winner in June 1976. These dates may slide
as a result of above mentioned difficulties.
C. UTILITY TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM
The Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS)
will be the Army's replacement for the Bell UH-1 Huey troop
carrying helicopter. UTTAS is to be faster, safer, more
versatile and less expensive than the Huey. It is designed
to be air transportable to any place in the world and read-
ied for flight within minutes after unloading (Ref. 53).
The RFP for the UTTAS was preceded by an intensive Army
study to determine the exact requirements to be included in
the specification. The study by the Army Combat Developments
Command (Ref. 54) covered all aspects of UTTAS project, in-
cluding costs, tradeoffs, and utilization. The release of
the RFP, however, aroused some criticism from Congress. The
Senate Armed Services Research and Development Subcommittee
questioned the following aspects of the request:
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1. the use of prototyping,
2. the length of the RFP,
3. the reliability goal of 0.986,
4. the requirement for the development of six
prototypes from each contractor,
5. the cost of engine development, and
6. the need for the UTTAS
.
These issues were answered by Brig. Gen. William J. Maddox,
Director of Army's Aviation (Ref. 55), bringing the Army's
views out into the open for criticism and rebuttal.
Source selection for the competitive prototype phase of
development was announced 31 August 1972. Vertol Division of
Boeing Co. of Philadelphia and Sikorsky Aircraft Division of
United Aircraft Corp. of Stratford, Conn, were awarded con-
tracts for the development of the YUH-61 and the YUH-60, re-
spectively for a competitive flyoff. This flyoff is scheduled
to take place in early 1976. The only other contractor com-
peting for the project was Textron's Bell Helicopter Division,
which also built the Huey. Its proposal was not completely
responsive since it tried to incorporate all it knew about
utility helicopters into its design. Industry sources said
that Sikorsky's UTTAS was superbly engineered and was designed
right to the Army's DTC target (Ref. 56).
The UTTAS is the first Army helicopter project undertaken
with the implementation of Design- to-Cost in the contract
(Ref. 51). The DTC objective of the RFP (Ref. 57) states:
"An objective of this contract is the successful
development of a Utility Tactical Transport Aircraft
System that can be produced at the lowest possible pro-
duction and life cycle cost. Therefore, in recognition
of this objective, the Contractor shall place maximum
emphasis on cost reduction through improved producti-
bility, maintainability, reliability and operational
design features. It is agreed and cs tablished that the
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UTTAS shall be capable of being produced at an average
recurring airframe cost of $600,000 or less (constant
FY 1972 dollars) based upon the total production quanti-
ties shown in Attachment 15 (confidential) of this con-
tract."
The contract further states which costs will be included in
this airframe cost objective:
"The airframe recurring cost includes recurring engineer-
ing direct labor and applicable engineering overhead,
manufacturing overhead, general and administrative over-
head, material and profit on recurring costs only
,
associated equipment such as engines, avionics and
weapons. Nonrecurring costs such as tooling, nonrecur -
ring engineering, and total costs of kits, GSE, GFE and
data are excluded " (emphasis added)
.
The Implicit Price Deflator is used to correct from FY '72
dollars to current dollars, as in the AAH contract. A
formula is also provided in the contract to provide for
computation of an incentive or penalty fee relative to the
design- to-cost objective. The UTTAS, being one of the first
DTC procurements, is not as tightly constrained by the cost
goals as subsequent projects, including the AAH (Ref. 52).
A decrease in funding for FY '75 will slow the project another
couple of months. The UTTAS has already been extended two
years as a result of changes in the Army procurement plans.
R$D through FY 1974 has cost the Army $187.2 million. Total
program costs for 1,107 helicopters are estimated at $2,675
billion (Ref. 52)
.
Both prime contractors for the airframe have expressed
confidence in the DTC cost goals. Cost control for Sikorsky
Aircraft involves two major activities (Ref. 58):
1) The cost/schedule planning, tracking, and control
of all program operations, and
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2) the targeting, tracking, and control of product cost
generated by program operations.
The application of the DTC concept involves four inter-
related activities including:
Design- to-Cost Target . These provide a positive control
on the final product costs generated by the design phase.
Tool-to-Cost Targets . The designers are given the planned
extent and type of tooling as factors to use in tradeoff
studies to determine alternative design approaches. In
the production phase, these goals become the tooling cost
targets to be met by the manufacturing department.
Purchase- to-Cost Targets . These goals influence the
selection of purchased parts and proprietary items in the
design phase. In the production phase, they help control
costs by influencing the selection of the source of pro-
duction parts and equipment.
Manufacture- to-Cost Targets . These are cost estimates
issued to the manufacturing department and monitored by
Silorsky's tracking system. Heavy emphasis was placed
upon the design phase, where considerable effort was
expended by designers to optimize their plans from a
cost standpoint.
Boeing Vertol Company has taken a different approach to
the DTC problems (Ref . 59) . Their plan "involves limiting
requirements to mission essentials, controlling sophistication,
identifying high cost designs, increasing standardization,
incorporating design to cost as a discipline consistent with
dynamics and stress, and providing the designer with guideline
bogeys and tools by which he can attain them."
One of the major areas of emphasis is the reduction of
parts to perform a function. Each system was given a parts
count bogey and the designer tried to design a system which
uses fewer parts than the bogey. Through cost estimating
relationships, Boeing Vertol has shown that reducing the
number of parts leads to reducing costs. In addition to
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parts reduction, the designer was encouraged to use automatic
riveting where possible since studies have shown that manual
riveting costs about five to six times more than automatic
riveting
.
Through the use of increased emphasis on cost control
throughout the program, both contractors are trying to meet
the Design-to Cost goals.
D. SAM-D MISSILE
The Army's SAM-D, surface-to-air missile system, is
designed to provide a mobile air defense for use with large
Army units. The SAM-D system is scheduled to replace both
the Raytheon M1M-23A Hawk missile and Western Electric M1M-14B
Nike Hercules in the 1980's (Ref. 60). The system is composed
of four major subsystems: the missile, radar group, weapon
control group, and the launcher group. These components are
assembled into a "fire section" consisting of several weapon
launchers, each with four missiles, a radar unit, and a control
unit which houses the computer. The launchers, remotely located
from the radar and control shelter, operate over a radio data
link. Six SAM-D fire sections comprise a battalion which may
be operated by as few as 33 men (Ref. 61). All components are
mounted on standard Army vehicles. A battalion can be trans-
ported by either C-141 or the Army's heavy lift helicopter.
In March 1972, following five years of advanced develop-
ment, Raytheon Company was awarded the full-scale engineering
development contract (Ref. 62). This contract extends through
December 1977 and has a total value of $564.8 million (Ref. 63).
7 9

The total RTD§E costs are estimated at $1.1 billion. An
additional $91 million is in management reserve. Estimated
total costs for the complete program are $4.5 billion. The
development contract with Raytheon is cost plus incentive fee
with Design- to-Cost goals for each of the subsystems. Table
IV shows the cost goals, number of units to be produced, and
Raytheon's expectations of meeting each goal.
TABLE IV
RAYTHEON DESIGN -TO -COST GOALS
(Source: Ref . 61)
Contractor '
s
I tern Cost Goal No. Units Expectations
Radar Unit $2.8 million 125 below goal
Launchers $250,000 625 close
Control Unit $887,000 125 below goal
Missile $90,000 6,250 hardest to meet,
close
The cost goals are based on established hardware config-
urations using 1972 constant dollars. Production schedules
and cost relationships were negotiated. The unit production
price includes
"all costs normally included in the contractor's hardware
production contracts such as all labor, including fabri-
cation, assembly, test and inspection, manufacturing,
engineering, and production control, all material, in-
cluding purchased parts, raw materials, and subcontracts;
all burdens including labor and material overhead, main-
tenance and modification of special tooling and test
equipment and profit and fee' ; (Ref. 43).
Management of effort toward achieving the production unit
price objective comprises one criterion in evaluating Ray-
theon's performance toward an award fee, not to exceed $5,068,857
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If Raytheon is selected to produce the SAM-D, an additional
reward/penalty provision will be included. There will be an
increase of 15% in earned fees if the final cost is less than
101 below target, and a decrease in fees of 25% for costs
greater than 10% above target. There will be no fee adjust-
ment for costs within 10% of target. There is, however, a
65/35 share ratio on all costs or savings within 10% of
target. The techniques used by Martin Marietta, the missile
development subcontractor, to reduce cost are discussed in
reference 26.
There is no competing contractor for the SAM-D system,
consequently there will be no fly-off or other system with
which to compare the Raytheon proposal. The cost reducing
incentive which competition brings is also missing. The
SAM-D has been attacked repeatedly by Senator Bayh (D-Ind)
,
questioning its necessity. In July 1973, his amendment to
the Defense Authorization Bill to delete all SAM-D funds was
narrowly defeated. In January 1974, the Senator succeeded
in requiring that a new cost-effectiveness study be conducted,
The analysis is being performed by OSD and the Army, with the
consultation of Congressional and GAO staffs (Ref. 53). The
Senator has stated that
"the SAM-D program exhibits many of the characteristics
identified with questionable weapon systems in the past.
They include changing capability requirements, persisting
technical uncertainties, unrealistic threat assessment,
postponed testing, incomplete cost-effectiveness analysis,
escalated costs for fewer units and inadequate justifica-
tion for the quantities to be procured." (Re£ . 62).
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In January 1974, then Deputy Defense Secretary Clement
reoriented the SAM-D program to SAM-D2 and shifted it from
engineering development back into advanced development. The
Army issued a "stop work" order February 4, 1974, which sus-
pended hardware and engineering activities, with exception
of guidance test flights. In its program reorientation, the
Army is studying CRef* 63):
1. tradeoffs to enhance low-altitude capability,
2. fire section hardware cost goals,
3. design for operation against a less intense
electronic countermeasure environment (a key
cost reducer)
,
4. increasing system mobility,
5. use in the continental air defense mission as
a secondary priority,
6. minimizing costs until the guidance system has
been successfully demonstrated.
The Defense Department reduced FY '75 funding by $54.7 million
to $111.2 million. Congress is considering reducing the fund-
ing another $11.2 million because of missile guidance problems.
In October 1974, the Army began a test program to permit
a production decision June 1975, on the less costly SAM-D2
version of the missile. It would reduce costs of the system
by including modifications to:
--eliminate one transmitter chain
--remove four sidelobe cancelers
--reduce memory
--eliminate one display console
--provide for alternate surveillance long-range waveforms
As of November 1974, the Army is seeking to minimize costs of
the program while awaiting tests of the guidance system. If
these tests prove successful, the Army wants to be able to
make an efficient transition to full scale development (Ref. 63)
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As a hedge against failure, the Army is planning to award
three additional contracts in January 1975, each for $1 mil-
lion, for development of a complementary guidance system.
Expected contractors are General Dynamics, Hughes, and Martin
Marietta CRef . 64)
.
E. SUBSONIC CRUISE ARMED DECOY
The Subsonic Cruise Armed Decoy (SCAD) is an Air Force
weapon system which was retrofitted with design- to-cost goals
after the full scale development contracts had been awarded.
The program was subsequently halted with one contract termin-
ated, "pending further study because of rising costs and
continuous debate over its required capabilities" (Ref. 65).
The SCAD is an air-launched guided missile, designed to
be carried aboard the B-52. It would be launched prior to
aircraft penetration of enemy early warning defenses. SCAD,
by simulating the mission profile of the B-52, would draw fire
toward itself and away from the manned bomber.
The Air Force divided the program into five separate
subsections for management and award of contracts, after DOD
authorization in mid-1972. The first SCAD contracts were let
in June 1972, when Williams Research Corporation and Teledyne
CAE were selected to develop small, efficient turbofan engines
to power the SCAD. Teledyne received $4.38 million and
Williams got $3 million to conduct an eight-month demonstra-
tion phase for their respective engine designs.
8 3

The principal guidance subsystem competitors were Northrop,
Singer Kearfott, Bendix, Delco Division of General Motors,
Litton Industries, and Boeing Company.
The airframe competitors were Boeing and Lockheed Missile
and Space Company. The decoy subsystem, which included noise
jamming transmitters, set-on receivers, and target repeaters,
was bid on by Hallicrafters , Philco-Ford, RCA Corporation,
Sanders Associates, and a team of GTE Sylvania and Raytheon.
The subsequent contracts were awareded by July 1972, to:
--Boeing Company for the airframe and air vehicle,
--Philco-Ford for the decoy subsystem,
--Litton Systems, Inc. for the guidance and control.
The SCAD System program office was organized similar to
other Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) SPO's,
except for three distinct characteristics. First, it retained
in-house, a major portion of the program management, including
systems integration. There was no prime contractor respon-
sible for the integration of the components . Second, a
systems analysis office was responsible for monitoring any
evolving threat in the Soviet defensive network to determine
if capability changes were required for the SCAD. The office
was to work closely with the Strategic Air Command and the
ASD ' s intelligence-gathering Foreign Technology Division.
Third, the procurement office was assigned responsibility to
monitor procurement schedules, costs, and performance, if
production is authorized in the future (Ref. 66).
The original RFP stated the Air Force objective as the
accomplishment of the program development at a minimum cost.
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Development contracts were of a cost incentive type. Design-
to-Cost, however, was not part of the original contracts.
In October 197 2, the contractors were asked to evaluate the
additional cost of contracting for the design to cost. In
November 1972, the contractors reported back to the SPO that
it would cost an additional $5 million to implement DTC
.
This price was considered unreasonable. The SPO negotiated
with each contractor to implement no-cost supplemental agree-
ments. These were to provide (Ref. 23):
1. the recognition of a DTC goal for recurring
production costs
,
2. a monthly review of the cost goal at Segment
Status Review meetings,
3. a detailed analysis of the goal at key program
milestones, and
4. an amendment to the statement of work requiring
future ECP's to include the net change in the
cost goal which would result.
By January 1973, all contracts were modified; however, no
incentives or penalties were incorporated to enforce adher-
ence to DTC goals. Contract modifications differed slightly.
Boeing refused to accept the ECP provision. Litton and
Teledyne agreed to indicate the impact of an ECP only if the
DTC goal changed 101 or more. Litton later changed this to
2%. As an example of the negotiated clauses, the January 1973
Litton supplemental agreement states in part (Ref . 67)
:
The contractor hereby agrees that the Design- to-Cost goal
for the SCAD Navigation/Guidance segment is $45,100 in
then year dollars based on a total of 1500 units based
on a delivery rate of two (2) units per working day. The
Design- to-Cost goal includes all recurring costs associ-
ated with the unit production of the SCAD Navigation/
Guidance segment, including direct material, material
overhead, direct labor, labor overhead and G^A and
excluding profit and Litton's budgetary estimate for
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ECO and Project Management sustaining costs; and the
aforementioned goal is based upon prior delivery of
thirty-five (35) RDT§E Navigation/Guidance segments
with initiation of production delivery immediately
thereafter. The Design- to-Cost goal shall be addressed
at each Segment Status Review (SSR) and reviewed if
variance of approximately 101 in the Design- to-Cost goal
is projected. The Design- to-Cost goal shall be reviewed
and analyzed within 30 days after Critical Design Review,
within 30 days after FCA/PCA and within 30 days after
the Completion of Qualification Testing."
It is worth noting that the cost goal agreed to in this, a
second modification, is $5,000 below that of the initial
modification in 1972.
Although the attempt to implement DTC into the SCAD pro-
gram followed the award of development contracts, the SPO
was able to introduce cost goals and a means of reviewing
those goals at no additional cost. Whether introduction at
this time was too late or whether the costs were already too
fixed is open to question. Without the existence of either
an award or incentive fee, there was no economic stimulus to
reduce cost. In addition, there were no competitive pressures
toward cost reduction. Threat of contract termination pro-
vided the only incentive for contractors to consider costs.
In July 1973, DOD ordered the Air Force to halt full
engineering development of SCAD. The Air Force issued a
termination notice to Boeing Company on its contracts for
modification of the G and H models of its B-52 bombers which
were to carry the SCAD. The Air Force also issued a "stop
work" notice on the Boeing airframe contract. Williams
Research Corp. was instructed to suspend further development
work on the engine. Phi J co -Ford Corp. was ordered to stop
development of the decoy electronics package (Ref. 65).
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In spite of the earlier contractual difficulties, the
Air Force is negotiating with Boeing for design, construction
and test of an air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) y similar to
the SCAD. The engine, the same as for the SCAD, will be
supplied by Williams Research Corp. The Air Force intends
to procure competitively the missile navigation/guidance
subsystem (Ref . 68)
.
F. LIGHTWEIGHT FIGHTER
In April 1972, Northrop and General Dynamics were selected
to design and build prototype lightweight fighters (LWF) for
the United States Air Force. Each company was to build two
aircraft. The fighter is to fit into the "high-low" mix
concept. The McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter ($15 million
per copy) is to provide the high cost, sophisticated system
with advanced long-range aircraft and missile capabilities.
The LWF is to provide low-cost ($3.0 FY '72 dollars per unit)
air superiority for handling a large portion of the close-in
threat after initial encounters (Ref. 67).
The Air Force followed the broad guidelines laid down by
former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard when the Air
Force Aeronautical Systems Division (ASD) prepared the RFP
and evaluated the proposals. The project was handled by a
newly formed, tightly-manned Prototype Programs Office (PPO)
.
This office was established only eight months before the LPW
contracts were awarded. Only 23 persons were assigned to it.
Most statements of work issued by the PPO were limited to
25-30 pages. These included broad performance goals and
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stressed the need for technology. Design- to-Cost and other
dollar constraints were explicitly conveyed to prospective
developers. Contractor proposals were also expected to be
brief. About 50 pages were allowed for the technical portion
and 10 pages for the management section. There were no re-
strictions on the cost proposal. In the case of the LWF
,
proposals were received at ASD on February 18, 1972, where
preliminary evaluations were made. The PPO received the
proposals on March 13, 1972. The winners were selected in
April (Ref. 68). In evaluating these proposals, the PPO did
not rate them on a scoring system basis as such. Each proposal
was assessed individually, identifying strengths and weaknesses
in the designs, based on computer studies.
The contracts were awarded on a cost-type basis with a
maximum obligation. The General Dynamics contract was for
$37.9 million. Northrop's contract was for approximately $39
million. There was no promise that the Air Force or any other
U.S. service would order either design into production. The
aircraft were not to be evaluated against each other in a
flyoff. Instead, they were to be evaluated separately by con-
tractor and Air Force pilots (Ref. 69). The DTG goal is $3
million in FY '72 dollars, to be produced at a rate of 100
per year for three years (Ref. 70). That cost includes air-
frame, engine, and avionics.
1 . General Dynamics YF-16
The YF-16 is a single-seat, single engine aircraft
optimized for air-to-air combat by providing good visibility,
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high maneuverability, fast acceleration, and improved radius
of action CRef. 71). The program personnel designed the air-
craft as an operational vehicle from the beginning. The only-
departures were made to meet cost and schedule requirements
for building the prototypes. The design goal was to produce
a low cost aircraft with a high degree of combat maneuver-
ability. This was to be achieved by building the smallest,
lightest vehicle possible and integrating advanced technologies
that promised low risk (Ref. 72).
A number of technological advances and design trade-
offs were made in order to meet the DTC goals. These include:
(1) engine selection
(2) component standardization
(3) aerodynamics innovations including:






(5) parts reduction and duplication
The Pratt § Whitney F100-PW-100 turbofan engine was
chosen for the YF-16 because it is used in the F-15 and its
logistic support would already be available in the Air Force
inventory. The improved fuel consumption of a turbofan over
a turbojet was desirable to help provide the required flight
radius. The decision to use a single engine to help minimize
the size of the aircraft saved approximately 151 in the design
gross weight, compared with the use of two engines. There
was also an additional dollar savings due to increased sim-
plicity and need for fewer controls and instruments. The
cost of the engine lias been reduced by substitution of sheet
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and stringer construction in the external ducts in lieu of
honeycomb material. This decreased the cost about $7,500
per engine. A simplified augmentor nozzle actuator system
is saving about $14,000 per engine. The engine changes are
not unique to the YF-16. These changes have come from the
F-15 program and have benefited both aircraft.
The use of a considerable number standard components
already in Air Force supply system is expected to save time
and cost. The YF-16 engineers identified 254 components in
the airplane that are identical with those used in other
aircraft. Only 20% of the components utilized in the two
prototypes were new (Ref. 73).
Advanced aerodynamic techniques were used in the
YF-16, primarily to meet the design goal of producing a highly
maneuverable fighter. Many of the tradeoffs have resulted in
cost savings. The use of leading edge maneuvering flaps,
incorporated to provide a better lift-to-drag ratio in high-
g-turns, allowed the use of a smaller, lighter wing. Wing-
body bending provided increased lift from the fuselage,
especially at high angles of attack. As a result, fuselage
volume was improved by approximately 9%. Fuselage length was
shortened by approximately five feet as compared to conven-
tional designs. An additional weight savings of over 550
pounds has resulted. Forebody wing strakcs, used to improve
lift and stability, also made possible a smaller wing. The
fly-by-wire control system eliminated the need for hydraulic
lines and control surface actuators throughout the aircraft.
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Although the system is more expensive than conventional
hydraulic controls, the savings in size and weight more than
make up for the cost (Ref. 74).
Designers were concerned with building in economic
manufacturing features as well as advanced technology. A
special standards book was developed for the engineers to
aid in parts selection. To keep down manufacturing costs,
formed sheet metal was utilized where possible, instead of
more expensive bonded structures. Machined parts were de-
signed to be worked on one side only, in most cases. These
simplified parts may be constructed by use of routers instead
of costly milling machines.
Aircraft subassemblies were designed for inter-
changeable, multiple use wherever possible. A single type
electro-hydraulic flight control servo is used in five places
to actuate flaperons, horizontal tail, and rudder. The left
and right horizontal tails are interchangeable, as are parts
of the airerons and flaps . Eighty percent of the parts of
the main landing gear are common to both sides. The combined
effect of these design features has been to reduce the empty
weight nearly 1,300 pounds.
2. Northrop VF-17
Northrop began development of its LWF by taking ad-
vantage of the experience it gained from the 900,000 man-hours
of work invested in designing the P-530 Cobra fighter for the
foreign market. Northrop used the same basic configuration
for the YF-17 that evolved from a six-year company-funded
91

advanced aerodynamic research effort for the P-530. The
company spent $25-$30 million during this period to advance
its technology from that used on the T-38 trainer and the F-5
fighter series. These expenditures occurred prior to the
award of the YF-17 contract (Ref. 75).
The YF-17 is a single-seat, twin-engine, convention-
ally controlled vehicle. It has a large bubble cockpit and
twin vertical tails but "there is no internal storage space
for stores, and provisions for weapons are nominal, with two
wing-tip mounted sidewinder missile positions and one M-61
20mm cannon (Ref. 71). The YF-17 is powered by two General
Electric YJ101 turbojet engines, which GE has adopted from
the F101-GE-F100 turbofan engine for the B-l bomber. The
YJ101 is scaled down, producing 15,000 pounds less thrust
than the 30,000 pound thrust F101. By allowing a 101 increase
in the minimum design weight of the core engine, the cost of
this section has been reduced about 351. The YJ101 uses an
afterburner cooled by engine bleed air rather than the complex
augmentation system installed on the B-l's engines. This
allowed a simpler design and lower cost construction. Each
percent of bleed air used, however, lowers engine net thrust
21 and increases specific fuel consumption about 1.5%.
Concerning the use of two engines in the YF-17 com-
pared with only one in the YF-16, the manager of the LWF
program at Northrop, Walter E. Fellers, said that both General
Dynamics and Northrop 's aircraft are designed for the same
performance spectrum and both have essentially the same weight
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and cost. He feels that there is no clear advantage in cost
for a single engine over a dual installation. Northrop
believes that the flyaway cost of a production version of the
twin engined YF-17 would be less than that for any comparable
engined aircraft for the mission. This leads Northrop to the
conclusion that two engines can be cheaper than one (Ref. 71).
The structure of the YF-17 design is largely conven-
tional. Graphite composites are used more than usual, repre-
senting a total weight of about 900 pounds, but saving about
300 pounds over conventional aluminum structures. Northrop
feels that graphite based composites can be used cost-effectively
where boron composites cannot. There are no major forgings on
the two prototypes on the grounds that only a production run
would merit the investment in costly dies. Designers have not
- deviated from production specifications even though both pro-
totypes were hand-made (Ref. 69).
3 . Air Combat Fighter
In September 1974, the Air Force delivered a request
for proposal to Northrop and General Dynamics for the "further
development, fabrication and flight test of an Air Combat
Fighter (ACF) suitable for USAF inventory and as a Multi-
national Fighter" (Ref. 76). The desired aircraft is to be
similar to the LWF prototypes. The Air Force desires that
contractors perform the ACF full scale development program,
including construction of 15 DT§E aircraft. Four aircraft
are to be configured with two seats. In addition, one static
and one fatigue model will be constructed. Necessary spares,
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ground support equipment, data, training and technical support
will be provided. The contract which is expected to be awarded
for full scale development includes:
Fixed price incentive fee
Target profit - 11%
Share ratio - 90/10
Ceiling - 1301
The expected contract for the production options for each of
three buys includes
:
Fixed price incentive fee
Target profit - 10%
Share ratio - 70/30
Ceiling - 130%
The ACF DTC clause addressed the average unit production
flyaway cost and is similar to the AX clause. An award fee
will be payable, based primarily "on the air vehicle design
cost reduction and opportunities guidance developed by the
LCC/DTC design trade studies conducted prior to the Critical
Design Review" (Ref . 76) . A second award fee will be based on
"supportability, including ground support equipment, training
and maintenance, design, cost reduction opportunites guidance
developed by the LCC/DTC design trade studies prior to flight
of the first DT§E aircraft" (Ref. 76). A performance incentive
is provided by the RFP to minimize logistics support costs.
Final source selection is slated to take place in mid-January
1975. A production decision has been scheduled for mid-1977,
with first production to enter inventory in 1980.
G. NAVY LIGHTWEIGHT FIGHTER
In June 1974, the Navy issued a pre-solicitat ion notice
seeking unfunded company assistance in developing a replacement
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for the F-4 aircraft. Offers were to be based on a unit fly-
away cost not to exceed $6 million (JFY '75 dollars) for the
procurement of 4Q0 aircraft to be produced at a rate of six
per month. The Navy sought to obtain a low cost fighter to
complement the high cost F-14 aircraft, which was first
introduced into the fleet in 1973. This new fighter, the
VFAX, is intended to be in the Navy inventory for the next
20 years.
By 15 July 1974, seven major aerospace companies had
responded to the request. However, in September 1974, Congress
redirected the Navy's efforts. The House of Representatives
eliminated the entire $34 million requested for VFAX develop-
ment in the 1975 Defense Appropriations bill. The Senate
Appropriations Comma ttee only reduced funding to $20 million.
This funding was agreed to by House-Senate conferences with
the stipulation that the money be used to modify the winner
of the Air Force ACF competition to Navy requirements (Ref. 77)
Navy and Air Force program officials began meeting daily
in an effort to work out the details of an aircraft designed
to perform both missions. To aid in adding Navy requirements
to «the YF-17 ACF proposal, McDonnell Douglas entered into an
agreement with Northrop to serve as prime contractor for joint
development of a VFAX proposal. General Dynamics and LTV
Aerospace Corp. agreed to offer a derivative of the YF-16 as
a joint proposal. A joint engineering team was created to
work out details (Ref. 79). Figure 4, from reference 80,









The RFP for the VFAX was issued in October 1974 (Ref. 81).
Included is a DTC clause to adjust the final contract incen-
tive fee* The cumulative DTC objective agreed to by the
contractor and the Navy will become the base figure in deter-
mining this fee. If the cumulative cost of the firm price
options requested in the proposal is less than the DTC
objective, an incentive fee will be increased by 15% of the
savings, not to exceed 15% of the target cost. For a total
price greater than the agreed upon objective, the fee will be
reduced by 151 of the excess over the objective. The proposal
attempts to hold the contractor responsible for reducing LCC
by including a logistic support clause. This clause estab-
lishes the requirements for the tracking and reporting of
integrated logistic support life cycle costs.
H. NWC PROJECTS
The authors interviewed key project personnel at the Naval
Weapons Center, China Lake, California. These meetings pro-
vided insights into management attitudes toward DTC and
problems facing its implementation.
1 . Advanced Long Range Air-to-Air Missile Systems
The advanced long range air-to-air missile system
(ALRAAM) is currently in exploratory development. Although
using advanced state of the art technology, DTC considerations
have been incorporated. A preliminary $150,000 unit flyaway
cost has been set. These DTC goals have been agreed to by




Improved V/eapons Delivery System
The improved weapons delivery system is an optical TV
or laser tracker/designator to be installed on the existing
Navy and Marine Corps A-4 aircraft. NWC has invested about
$6 million in developing a flying breadboard prototype to
prove feasibility.
An RFP has been issued for commercial development.
Although not viewed as mandatory, locally developed DTC pro-
visions were included. Program costs are expected to remain
below DSARC thresholds. The RFP set unit cost goals at
$125,000 (FY '73) for the initial production of 150 units
produced at a rate of 7 per month. This goal was developed
by the project office, without benefit of a formal cost
analysis
.
The contractor is expected to recommend tradeoffs for
cost reduction. Areas for tradeoff include reliability, cir-
cuit simplification, temperature requirements and delivery
schedule. Project personnel, however, expressed a fear of
being denied cost tracking data from the Navy Regional Pro-
curement Office.
3 Improved Sparrow
The Sparrow AIM-7F weapon system was initiated in
1968 but had DTC imposed upon it in 1973. At this point,
many design parameters had become fixed, including airframe
shape and weight. The belated requirement for additional
tradeoff analysis increased program costs. Design-to -Cost




The DTC goal for an improved Sparrow is defined by
constant dollar, recurring production costs. The WBS was
used to prepare DTC worksheets from which the DTC goal was
determined.
4 . High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile
The high speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) program
is an improvement upon the Shrike missile system. The inte-
grating contractor is Texas Instruments Corp. Design- to-cost
was applied in 197 2 at the time of the DCP . During this
period, CER analysis was performed and a target of $40,000
was set for the seeker section, control section, wings and
fins and the proximity sensor. This is not a complete "fly-
away" cost. The initial contract covered engineering, proto-
type and pilot production phases of development. The first
two phases were CPAF and the third was CPIF.
The contract required Texas Instruments to make per-
formance and cost tradeoffs. However, specified GFE could
not be rejected if it met specifications. The project man-
agers felt that DTC led to many beneficial tradeoffs and that
HARM became a better system because of it.
The developers of the HARM showed a great deal of
contractual far-sightedness. Included in the contract were
features to compensate for changes in the value of money, the
quantity produced, and the delivery schedule. The Wholesale
Price Index for "Metals and Materials" (WPI Code 10) and the
Labor Cost Index or the Gross Average Hourly Earnings of the
Production Workers in the Aircraft Industry (SIC Code 3721)
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are used to adjust material and labor cost changes, according
to the following formula:
Adjusted price = Negotiated price x Correction factor
where:
Negotiated price = unit target price negotiated
for the first production contract
Correction factor = .70 (WPI ratio) + .30 (LCI ratio)
The schedule adjustment will be made in accordance
with an agreed upon cumulative average unit cost versus
quantity curve. A change in this learning curve will adjust
the price according to an agreed upon formula. By using a
combination of the two adjustments, the unit target price
can be adjusted for both quantity and production rate. Any
changes ordered by the Government will be pre-priced so as





Several assumptions and conclusions may be derived from
this study. These serve as the basis for how the authors
view the DTC problem. Their opinions fall into two areas:
what DTC is trying to do, and major problems that still
persist
.
A. PURPOSE OF DESIGN-TO-COST
In order to properly understand DTC, one must view this
policy within its historical perspective, its relationship
to other reforms, and general problems facing DOD procure-
ment. Design- to-Cost is simply another tool intended to
cope with budgetary restrictions and public criticism facing
weapons system acquisition. Not intended to stand alone, DTC
seeks a systematic approach to cost control. Costs are being
introduced as a serious design parameter for the first time.
Increasing cost awareness has affected designers as well as
DOD. Cost estimating relationships are being developed in
order to project financial needs. Tracking capabilities in
the form of standardized accounting and reporting procedures
aid in keeping programs under control.
Greater emphasis is being placed upon R§D . Program man-
agers are being tasked with evaluating design iterations and
parameter tradeoffs. Cost reimbursement contracts encourage
wider studies, seeking innovative approaches to problem sol-
ution. Contractor flexibility is increased through use of
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performance specifications. Developers are encouraged to
help draw up RFP's, setting goals and thresholds. Compe-
tition and tradeoff analyses are being applied to optimize
designs
.
Setting of cost goals has pushed advancement of CER
technology. Life cycle cost control is deemed in the best
interests of the Government, but has encountered numerous
problems. Unit production cost goals, being easier to de-
termine, have been adopted as an interim solution.
The intent of DTC is to apply lessons from the commercial
world. Vast experience exists in developing marketable
products, cost control procedures, and development team
management. Several legal, political, and policy constraints
prevent wholesale acceptance of commercial practice.
While progress is being made, a great deal of learning
and change of attitude must yet take place. Modern manage-
ment principles, encouraging lower level participation, run
counter to established central authority and accountability.
Consecutive contracts still resemble total package procure-
ment. Cost estimating procedures require further development
Finally, there are those who, for many reasons, feel that DTC
cannot work.
B. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
Several areas need further development if DTC is to
emerge as an effective procurement strategy. While not all
inclusive, the list of questions presented below represent





The DTC program has encountered considerable skepti-
cism among developers who feel that weapons quality is being
degraded by purchasing "cheap" systems. These old habits
and ideas die hard, having negative impacts upon morale.
Substitution of UPC for LCC, cost and technical uncertain-
ties, and conflicting policy interpretations have led to
confusion. Goal verification, management restrictions, and
political pressures have shown that DTC is not a cure- all.
Convincing participants that DTC is a viable concept and
here to stay is vital to its ultimate success.
2 Inconsistent Accounting Definitions
Problems related to defining cost parameters have
hindered the search for historical data necessary for CER
formulations. Such difficulties can be related largely to
definition and accounting procedures. Industrial practices
such as allocation of overhead may comprise two-thirds of
the total costs for aeronautical contractors (Ref. 51).
Other variables not explicitly shown in aggregate costs in-
clude schedule changes, ECP 's , • management ability, political
effects, competitive pressures, learning, and financial status
of the contractor. Operations and support costs may be masked
by appropriations categories, industrial funding procedures,
and other accounting practices. Varying mission demands,
staffing levels, and support availability further complicate
data collection. A system of uniform definition and account-




Emphasis Upon Unit Production Costs
The selection of UPC targets is intended as an interim
solution to DTC goals. Several influences encourage prolonged
usage of UPC. Production cost levels are more visible than
overall LCC. Designing to low LCC may tend to raise UPC.
As a contractor begins to overrun costs, his attention con-
centrates upon UPC to avoid loss of contracts. There does
not appear to be any great pressure from DSARC to move from
UPC goals. Balances between UPC and LCC are not specified
as general policy. Congressional funding procedures involve
separate subcommittees and budget line items for development,
production, and manpower/logistics.
4 Disregard of Operation and Support Costs
In addition to tho^e pressures favoring UPC, there
appear to be factors discouraging close examination of 0§S
costs. Such costs are difficult to determine. Projections
can be validated only in the long run. Usage and support
plans for the entire life of a system are not possible in
many cases. Enforcement of any O^S goals over the long term
is most difficult.
5 . Degree of Standardization
Many informal guides have been drawn up to aid in
dissemination of general DTC policies. Each project office,
however, has had to work out many practical problems by it-
self with very limited assistance. Attitudes toward standard-
ization vary. The Air Porce, seeking to maintain flexibility,
avoids a rigid standard (Rcf. 82). The Army, on the other
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hand, seeking a unified approach, standardizes as much as
possible (Ref. 83). Various studies indicate that DTC appli-
cation varies with management personalities and experience.
This variation is displayed in goal makeup, definitions,
methods of goal selection, and varying means of making
tradeoffs
.
Without a standardized approach, each project is
allowed to select its own ground rules, providing no basis
for cost/effectiveness comparisons. Industrial inputs to
developing RFP ' s seek favorable parameter definitions as each
contractor maneuvers for competitive advantage. Cost goals
vary by project, including various combinations of recurring,
non-recurring, R§D, profit, and LCC expenditures (Ref. 43).
The time of introduction and rigidity of cost goals vary
widely. Procedures for handling contractual changes are not
often addressed. Criteria for usage of GFE are not clearly
defined. Requirements relating to subcontracting do not
follow an established pattern.
Standardization, especially for RFP ' s , would seem
desirable. Inputs relating to mission scenario, minimum
performance, reliability, delivery schedules, support areas,
and definitions should be common to all programs, as also
recommended by reference 84. This is currently not true.
6 . Unusual Cases
There appears to be doubt concerning which programs
should have DTC applied. Those projects having low R§D or
high production costs should lend themselves best to DTC.
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In cases where few items are produced, the benefits of DTC
may not amortize R§D expenditures. Critical systems vital
to national security may resist DTC application. The Army
presently requires that DTC be used everywhere except where
such actions are determined not to be in the public interest




Quantity of R6JD Spending
One of the basic R§D aims has been LCC reduction.
Increasing RfjD spending beyond certain levels will normally
show diminishing marginal returns. The question of how these
relationships are traded off still remains. One commonly
used approach sets the UPC target as a design constraint.
Designs are managed as necessary to meet this cost. An
arbitrary figure thereby becomes a rigid parameter, and
optimization possibilities are diminished. Parametric anal-
ysis must be developed to replace qualitative guesses by
managers
.
High R^D costs related to DTC are aggravated by cost
reimbursement type contracts. Rules must be developed for
setting funding limits for different contractors with vary-
ing capabilities.
8 Data Shortages
Shortages of historical cost data present the biggest
stumbling blocks to development of parametric CER capabili-
ties. Various definitions and accounting systems contribute
to these problems. Different data banks are used by contractors
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project offices, Naval Material Command, and CAIG . Each
organization defines its own parameters and uncertainty-
levels, based on its own sources of information. With each
entity developing its own data for its own purposes, there
is little hope for much improvement in the near future.
9 . Rigidity of Goals
The firmness with which cost goals are applied has
been a source for concern. Absolute thresholds which require
DSARC approval for additional spending involve delays and
discourage pursuit of promising technologies. Performance
is now maximized, subject to a budgetary constraint. Flex-
ible goals may encourage further intelligent tradeoffs, but
become more difficult to enforce. This may result in return-
ing to a cost justification rationale. These problems apply
to subcontractors as well.
Such difficulties are typical of fields involving
new technology and high risk. Program, schedule, and engi-
neering changes all impact upon these goals. Until developers
can define, design, analyze, and estimate costs for each sub-
system, this problem will remain.
10 . Planning Problems
Uncertainties related to program development greatly
restrict long range planning capacity. Single-year funding
by Congress causes managers to focus largely on current
development phases. Several factors control the size of
annual program budgets, including threat analysis, system
values, inflation, and political considerations. As a result,
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managers are continually having to "sell" their programs to
avoid cancellations or cutbacks. Long range planning is




Research and development efforts have a special need
for reserve funding in order to take advantage of new dis-
coveries or overcome unforeseen problems. Such funding must
be accessible in sufficient quantities to provide required
program flexibility. This money may be difficult to account
for if placed at the program manager's discretion and may be
used to cover bad judgement. For these reasons, such finan-
cial support is often severely restricted or unavailable.
12 Cost Uncertainties
Estimating cost is always difficult when dealing in
uncertain technology. Industrial engineering approaches
normally provide point type estimates, accepting errors of
unspecified size, due largely to technological limitations,
cost omissions, and excessive optimism. Parametric CER's
normally provide confidence intervals, allowing for errors
and removing necessity for "padding" estimates. Large un-
certainties may be virtually useless, however. Such errors
on a subsystem basis tend to stabilize in the aggregate.
Other areas, dealing with schedule and requirements changes,
provide additional problems. More CER experience and stand-








Designers face a dynamic environment as they advance
the state of the art and expose new problems. Weapons tech-
nology faces a constantly changing problem as the enemy seeks
to conceal capabilities and intentions, while actively at-
tempting to complicate threat analysis. Sufficient invest-
ments of time and money can buy nearly anything. Managers
are therefore faced with difficult decisions of whether
proposed solutions are worth the effort entailed.
14
.
Problems of Enforcement and Incentives
Design- to-Cost attempts to provide a means by which
designs from one source are built by another, and maintained
by a third, according to an undefined usage and support plan.
Experience has shown that award fees are not as effective
as competitive pressure for holding down costs. Program
cancellations appear to be an idle threat, especially for a
critical system. Competition for follow-on contracts places
a prior contractor in an advantageous position. Future con-
tracts must be worth competing for or a de facto total package
procurement situation arises. Actual operations and support
costs do not affect production contracts. Contractual
enforcement of these costs provides a difficult problem.
15 Contractor Optimism
Undue optimism is an innate problem where pressures
result from competition and program approval. The Government
is, in many cases, unable to take its business elsewhere.
All contractor cost estimates therefore emanate from a
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conflict of interest situation. Until valid third party





In order to deal effectively with technological and
cost uncertainties, industrial inputs are required in prepar-
ing RFP's. Contractor freedom, allowing widely differing
approaches to a problem, promises to make source selection
more difficult. Comprehensive source selection criteria
must be developed and communicated to prospective contractors,
17 Technical Transfusion
Industrial inputs to the RFP lead to another problem
area. Means must be provided to protect a contractor's pro-
prietary data or unique approach. If this is not done, com-
peting contractors will withhold such information, decreasing
the effectiveness of initial planning so vital to the entire
program.
18 Parallel Development Costs
Parallel development and duplication of effort are
intrinsic to the competitive environment. Such practices
greatly increase the level of R§D expenditure. Reduction
of LCC requires that additional development spending be off-
set by subsequent savings. There does not appear to be any
feasible solution, except to minimize those unnecessary areas
where efforts are duplicated. Criteria must be developed






Limits to R^D funding curtail research for better
ways to meet needs. Further limiting creative efforts are
policies of standardization and use of GFE . The balance
between creativity and simplified logistics is an open area
for study.
20 Project Manager Status and Motivation
The role of the project manager is central to a
viable DTC effort. Tradeoff authority requires ability and
training. Professional development combines line officer
experience, to comprehend needs, with staff corps background,
to deal effectively within the bureaucratic environment.
Decision authority should rest at the lowest practicable
levels to allow quick response. The complexities relating
to size, nature, and aggregate effects of changes complicate
this issue. Stability of management teams would help avoid
errors due to inexperience and resultant management by direc-
tives. Motivational problems result from inadequate profes-
sional background, fast rotation, unavailability of saved
money, military structure, political pressures, and heavy
reporting requirements. Unless these problems are solved,
any management effort will be crippled.
21. Retrofits
Attempts to retrofit programs with DTC goals have
had negative impacts upon development. In many cases, system
designs have stabilized and tradeoff possibilities are limit-
ed. Design- to-Cost then receives little more than lip service
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The poor reception given retrofits results from late intro-




Delays in Change Review
Compulsory high level approval of program changes
results in costly delays. These, in turn, result in fewer
change proposals and fewer improvements. Participatory man-
agement seeks low level review, but may jeopardize overall
program control. A system is needed for establishing
appropriate change review levels.
23 Contractual Changes
Procedures for contractual adjustments are only rarely
addressed in present DTC contracts (Ref. 86). These contract
revisions then become an open-ended problem. Ouestions arise
concerning what kind of revisions impact DTC goals, and their
quantitative effects. Change procedures must be addressed in
an enforceable manner.
2 4 Determination of Essential Requirements
The setting of unnecessarily high performance thresh-
olds has compromised DTC (Ref. 43). Intelligent application
of threat analysis tempered by contractor inputs must be at-
tained, especially for critical systems, if room is to be
provided for tradeoffs
.
2 5 . Program Review and Control
Control of programs has historically been a difficult
area. Traditional RT,D uncertainties arc aggravated by DTC.
Conflicting demands, between modern management practice and
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control requirements, favor low and high level management
review, respectively. This situation is further complicated
by political intrusion. Finally, impositions of DOD manage-
ment reporting systems may overlap and confuse a contractor's




Flexibility is essential to contractor creativity.
Pursuit of unusual approaches, especially under cost reim-
bursement conditions, may be difficult to control. Conflict-
ing needs for accountability and design freedom must be
resolved.
27. When Cost Goals Should Be Applied
Conflicts exist concerning timing of cost inputs.
If introduced too early in conceptual stages, cost consider-
ations may limit exploration. Excessive delays for cost
inputs result in their degraded emphasis. Cost parameters
then assume the form of a retrofit. Policy determinations
in this area are necessary.
28. Operation Usage Definition
Accurate descriptions of operational usage are critical
to LCC determination. Clear agreement must exist concerning
O^S inputs as well as quality of maintenance. Such deter-
mination for a long lived system involves many variables. A
means must be provided to allow real life deviations from such
predictions
.
2 9 Elimination of Detailed Specification s
The continued existence of detailed design specifi-
cations illustrates the reluctance within DOD to emphasize
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performance goals. Being input-oriented instead of output-
oriented, detailed blueprints restrict system capabilities
by limiting RfjD avenues. Such constraints must be removed
to allow contractors room for creative efforts.
30
.
Uses of Saved Funds
Prudent project management seeks reductions in costs
to taxpayers. Funds that are saved in this manner do not
become available for other uses, however. This reduces the
cost cutting incentive. The possible uses of such funds and
their accountability pose productive and interesting topics
for further study.
31 Prototype Tooling
The types of tooling used in building aircraft
p ro t o typ es have been shown to impact upon source selection.
Use of expensive production type tooling tends to lower risks
associated with production cost projection. Changes to this
type of tooling are not easily effected and are done at high
cost. Hand-built prototypes, on the other hand, are cheaper
to construct and change, but have higher cost projection
risks involved. Questions then arise concerning whether
such risk reductions warrant the greater expenses involved.
Present competitive efforts between these approaches do not
provide the direct comparisons needed for efficient source
selection.
32 Escalation Factors
Inflationary times such as these require special
attention be given to changes in price indices.
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Presently most contracts use one price deflator for all costs
This is not realistic in industries where relative price
changes differ drastically between different program inputs.





Design-to-Cost is a relatively new approach to DOD pro-
curement and is still undergoing transition. As experience
grows, many current problem areas should become less trouble-
some. The large quantity of philosophical material that is
now available does not provide detailed guidance for the
field practitioner. This study attempts to bridge this gap
with specific recommendations and to examine their effects
upon present problem areas. A brief summary is presented
in section B of this chapter. The reader is left to draw
his own conclusions concerning the efficacy of such recom-
mended actions upon his own project areas.
A. RECOMMENDED ACTIONS
The associated list of recommendations represents a com-
pilation of those items the authors feel are required for a
successful DTC program. While not a comprehensive list,
these proposed actions are ones which have been disregarded
to some degree by the various programs studied.
1 . Enforce Use of Performance Specifications
Laying the burden of proof upon those who would
insist upon design specifications will cause thinking to be-
come output-oriented. Program managers can intelligently
evaluate alternative approaches against mission performance
criteria. This will require fewer formal changes and asso-
ciated delays, while assuring desired output. Clear agreement
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upon what is really needed will direct R§D efforts in such a
manner as to take best advantage of contractor originality.
Source evaluation can be compared against desired performance.
The buyer merely asks whether the contractor is offering what
is really needed.
On the negative side, such use of specifications may
impact adversely upon unusual or highly complex programs.
Cost uncertainty may increase since the buyer will not know
the exact type of system he is buying.
2 . Standardized Design- to-Cost Approach
Recent history indicates that many DTC projects work
with little crossfeed between them. With no Government
"memory" upon which to draw, individual managers continually
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approach and definitions. Cost targets include everything
from recurring hardware to all associated costs. Lip service
only is given to LCC in most cases. With no common denominator,
it is impossible to directly compare programs.
Insertion of DTC clauses into ASPR will enhance
credibility by showing that DTC is here to stay and force
development of CER state of the art. Universal acceptance
of guidelines will help standardize accounting practices and
provide adequate tracking measures using a C/SCSC format.
Common understanding and procedures will aid in planning
management reserves, source selection, and contractual re-
negotiation .
The pursuit of complete standardization should not
disallow novel approaches to unusual problems.
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Flexibility should be provided for each system type. Appar-
ently discredited practices, such as total package procurement,
may still have their place. Competition with parallel costs
is not always justified. Criteria must be developed to justify
such activities so that development creativity is not sacri-
ficed on the altar of standardization.
3. Common Data Bases Universally Available
Data shortages related to historical experiences are
the biggest obstacles to a cost projection capacity. The
Department of Defense is the world's largest buyer of equip-
ment. By pooling resources, such experience can be preserved
in an accessible manner. Each developer would then have access
to the largest data bank possible. Standard accounting pro-
motes understanding, cooperation, and ease of planning. It
also aids in program control by eliminating unpleasant sur-
prises. Increased planning confidence helps set financial
reserve levels. Common data pools aid in management reviews,
eliminate delays, and simplify source selection procedures.
Unusual programs are easily distinguished and can be treated
accordingly. A centralized computer lookup under cognizance
of CAIG will permit immediate access and instant update of
operational usage and C/SCSC formated development data.






Retrofits of DTC have been poorly received by engineers.
Attempting to optimize a design with new parameters added later,
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requires a whole new R^D effort. For this reason, retrofits
have not been properly implemented. This problem should
decrease with passage of time as new programs implement DTC
in initial planning.
5 . Professional Project Manager
The status and capacity of the project manager greatly
affects the development of a program. Expeditious handling
of problems and changes avoids costly delay. The project
manager has often had his authority limited by charter,
affecting his ability to approve tradeoffs. Most project
managers are not professionals in the procurement field and
rely heavily upon their own limited experience. The successful
line officer is not necessarily the best manager.
The procurement career must be greatly upgraded. Part-
time managers must be replaced with competent professionals
who know their work and whose judgement can be trusted. Such
a person must be required to demonstrate his competence within
the project before being advanced to leadership positions.
Opportunity must exist to grow with a project. Such a manager,
having been promoted from within an organization, should retain
his position to allow further personal development. People
charged with such high expenditures for vital combat systems
should be provided commensurate opportunities for further
advancement and status. Until such a dedicated and professional
approach to project management is developed, there can be no





Supply Cost Feedback to Engineers
Traditional management approaches, seeking to preserve
creativity by isolating design engineers from cost implications,
are being changed (Ref. 87). Feedback of costs is common in
commercial industry. Several methods may be applied, depend-
ing on the company or project involved. Inclusion of produc-
tion engineers in design teams, detailed cost sheets, parts
count bogies, and elaborate computer outputs are being used
by various projects. Fast, accurate feedback can affect
selection of designs, materials, and manufacturing tolerances.
Incentives such as awards, peer pressure, evaluations, merit
reviews, and participation in submission of proposals have
shown demonstrable beneficial effects.
7. Hold Project Managers Accountable
for Operation and Support Costs
Managers tasked with procurement do not normally con-
cern themselves with 0§S cost (Ref. 27). Manning and logistics
problems are faced by different individuals and are, therefore,
not as visible to the designer. Logistics support, relia-
bility, and maintainability must have a strong input to the
DCP . The program manager must be held responsible for these
areas. Reliability data [mean time between failures, mean
time to repair, maintenance hours per operating hour, turn-
around time, etc.), personnel requirements, support, and
training must be given early consideration and included in
tradeoffs. Tradeoff studies can be fed into data banks,
simplifying later design iterations. Experience can be gained
only by forcing LCC considerations. These demands must then
120

be specified contractually in a quantitative manner. Such





Single-year funding procedures, while providing
Congress with some measure of program control, result in
continuing uncertainty on the project level. Introduction
of multi-year funding with its long range stability will
greatly enhance project planning. Visible relationships
between R§D and other costs can be established. Program
changes can then be integrated into an overall structure.
Such a structure is essential to any well planned management
effort.
9 Use of Standard Parts when Availab le
Unlimited contractor flexibility may encourage
development of non-standard parts and subsystems, causing
long range logistics problems. Requiring usage of standard
parts where practicable lowers R§D and tooling costs. Advan-
tage can then be taken of long production runs and learning
effects. Long range reliability data related to standard
parts removes technical uncertainties and allows firmer LCC
proj ections
.
1 . Critical Examination of Requirements
The practice of designing by committee has led to
attempts to please everyone, resulting in the necessity to
constantly advance technical states of the art. Contractor
optimism contributes to the setting of unnecessarily high
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thresholds which leave little room for tradeoffs. Design
then begins to focus more upon performance than cost. Goals
must be ranked as mandatory, significant, or desirable within
a mission scenario. Unless flexibility can be provided to
developers, there can be no hope for successful cost control.
11 . Multiple Contractor Proposals
Manufacturers may view several ways to solve a
problem. Potential proposals which may fall slightly short
of a threshold are withheld for fear of being declared un-
responsive. Allowing contractors to submit secondary proposals
which nearly meet such objectives, but at significantly less
cost, may lead to reevaluation of threshold criteria. This
may help solve problems related to overly stringent require-
ments .
12 . Contractor Warranties
The basic DTC problem is now to include reliability,
maintainability, and manning levels in addition to UPC as a
standard for the LCC goal. Traditional use of unilateral
award fees entails little risk to contractors. Warranties,
while increasing acquisition costs, will shift LCC risk to
contractors and increase their interest in the problem. Life
cycle usage and support must be defined and agreed upon, how-
ever. Maintenance not in strict, accordance with contractor
specifications may void these warranties. In addition,
production line status is critical to replacement of defective
items. A short range warranty requirement would be desirable








Requiring a contractor to maintain his equipment for
a limited period after production will shift his interests
toward reliability and maintainability. Usage of fixed price
or cost sharing contracts will spread LCC risks from the
Government. At the same time, cost histories will be estab-
lished for later use. Contractor maintenance promises to be
more flexible than use of warranties, taking advantage of
existing commercial logistics systems. Contractor familiarity
can be best used for non-deploying equipment such as large
missiles or for major overhaul of those systems that are
highly mobile. Periodic reopening of contracts can help
avoid problems associated with total package procurement.
1 4
.
Specify Contractual Change Proc edure
s
Those assumptions used in defining DTC goals (quanti-
ties, delivery rates, periods of time, etc.) must be held
constant if these goals are to remain valid. Impacts of any
changes are not normally addressed, however. The Army merely
states that adjustments from UPC goals will be done in an
equitable manner (Ref. 86). The Navy restricts changes only
to those areas outside the control of a contractor. To avoid
misunderstanding, litigation, and program disruptions, it is
recommended that change formulae be incorporated within con-
tracts and include only those items having a direct bearing
upon DTC goals. This should be of greatest benefit in those
cases where a contractor "buys into" a contract in hopes of






Allow Services to Keep Part of Cost Savings
Current policies denying the services use of money
saved by prudent management decrease incentives for effective
cost control. By returning to the services a given percentage
of these savings, this incentive may be reinstituted . Such
funding could be used for further research or applied to
management reserves, thereby benefiting all concerned.
16
.
Increased Emphasis Upon Competition
During the course of this study the authors discovered
cases where source selection appeared to be inexplicably
limited, even in cases where contractual relationships had
historically been unsatisfactory. Such cases must be mini-
mized. Competitive pressures, except in unusual situations,
have bppn shown to be more effective than unilateral awards,
justifying the increased development spending.
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Relationships between defined problem areas and recommended
actions are summarized in Figure 5. The impact of a proposed
remedy upon these problems is shown by a plus ( + ) or minus
C - ) indicating potential improvements or aggravations,
respectively. Areas having no anticipated or unknown impact
are left blank. Due to the varieties of programs and associ-
ated conditions, no attempt can be made to guage the magnitudes
of these effects. Rather, this should aid in delineating
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